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Abstract
Knowledge management (KM) is becoming recognized as a valuable tool for the
Department of Defense (DoD) in its effort to maintain a competitive, strategic advantage
against its enemies in a new threat environment. Decision superiority is the ultimate end
result and is only possible through the effective and efficient use of its chief key
resource--knowledge. As the Air Force seeks to transform the way it does business the
concept of knowledge management has made its way to the forefront of both the Air
Force's Information Strategy and Information Resource Flight Plan. This research
assesses the usefulness of a knowledge management decision framework previously
designed for the Air Force by Captain William Bower (2001) and refined by 1st Lt
Jeffrey Phillips (2003) referred to as the Bower-Phillips decision framework. Guided by
the framework, a case study was undertaken at an Air Force organization in an attempt to
identify and address potential knowledge management opportunities. The framework
was found to be useful in identifying possible KM opportunities.
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ASSESSING THE USEFULNESS OF THE DECISION FRAMEWORK FOR
IDENTIFYING AND SELECTING KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PROJECTS

I. Introduction
Background
The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently undergoing a transformation. A
major part of this transformation is the identification of potential opportunities to exploit
technology in order to maintain an advantage over potential enemies in the light of new
challenges (HQ-USAF/XPXC, 2003). Doing this sometimes requires a new way of
thinking and adapting of our current posture and wartime readiness. In the current
military operating environment of fighting the current global war on terrorism, while at
the same time planning for future combat, the only real certainty facing our combat
forces is uncertainty. One of the ways of ensuring that the DoD maintains a competitive,
strategic advantage against its enemies is through decision superiority which is achieved
through the effective and efficient use of our chief key resource--knowledge.
As the Air Force begins to adapt to this new era by transforming military
capabilities in order to maintain an advantage over potential enemies many opportunities
to exploit technology are being considered. One of these opportunities, knowledge
management (KM), has made its way to the forefront of the Air Force's Transformation
Flight Plan, Information Resources Flight Plan, and Information Strategy (AF/CIO,
2002, 2004; HQ-USAF/XPXC, 2003).

1

Problem Statement
The Air Force is the adolescent in the playing field of knowledge management
practitioners within the DoD. The Army and Navy have both been successful in
implementing KM initiatives and have knowledge strategies, knowledge management
strategies, and knowledge management frameworks developed to assist subordinate
organizations in the development and implementation of KM opportunities (Bower,
2001). Early attempts of implementing KM within the DoD have been shown to provide
benefits to include improved business processes and greater employee and customer
satisfaction (Sasser, 2004).
Absent an Air Force level knowledge strategy, knowledge management strategy,
or knowledge management framework, and as Air Force organizations look to implement
knowledge management, commanders and managers desire a comprehensive "roadmap"
to assist in identifying potential KM opportunities. An initial decision framework for
identifying and selecting KM initiatives was designed in March 2001 by the research
effort of Captain William Bower. A subsequent study in March 2003 performed by 1st
Lt Jeffrey Phillips evaluated this initial framework and adapted it to include a more indepth assessment of organizational culture and its affect on KM. Both studies relied on
Delphi panels to identify the steps of the framework. Capt Bower recommended that the
theoretical framework be used in a real-world field environment to validate the concepts
presented. This study will take the adapted framework and examine its usefulness in the
real-world setting of an organization attempting to identify and implement KM.
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Research Question
How well does the Bower-Phillips decision framework support an organization's
decision making process necessary to select specific knowledge management (KM)
projects?
Methodology
An explanatory case study of an Air Force organization attempting to identify
potential knowledge management opportunities was conducted using the Bower-Phillips
decision framework designed to assist in identifying potential knowledge management
(KM) opportunities. An explanatory case study was an appropriate methodology in this
situation to test the usefulness of the designed framework in a real-world setting (Leedy
& Ormrod, 2001). The specific case under study was the 738th Engineering Installation
Squadron (EIS), a unit interested in identifying potential KM opportunities. Data
collected included specific unit mission information, internal documents, various Air
Force (AFIs), Air Force Material Command Instructions (AFMCIs), information
technology (IT) structure, commander's briefings, and interviews with key squadron
personnel.
Assumptions
Although extensive literature exists on knowledge management (KM) in
commercial industry (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Holsapple & Joshi, 2002), less exists
for the military and specific Air Force units. Many of the KM issues prevalent in
industry and civilian institutions may not have equivalent issues in the military culture
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and vice versa. A few specific differences of commercial companies from military
organizations include the requirement to remain profitable, the need to remain flexible
and sensitive to specific market pressures, cultural issues, and personnel longevity.
Although there are differences, evidence exists that both military and commercial
organizations implementing KM are influenced by some of the very same factors
(Bartczak, 2002). Therefore, since the majority of current KM literature is based solely
on empirical study of the commercial sector it is to be assumed that KM issues found in
current literature will apply to military, specifically Air Force, organizations. Also, it
was known going into this study that no knowledge management practices were currently
being implemented at the 738th EIS.
Thesis Overview
This document will report the efforts taken to answer the research question
presented in this chapter. In Chapter II, literature will be reviewed to support the
theoretical foundation for this effort and provide a resource for the sponsor of the study.
Specifically, a general review of knowledge, knowledge management (KM),
technological issues associated with KM, and influences and barriers of KM will be
explored, followed by a review of a KM research framework, and subsequent additions,
identified for this study. Chapter III details the research methodology specific to this
study, while Chapter IV presents the results of the case study. Chapter V presents
discussion of the results, limitations of the study and recommendations for future
research.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
This research effort applied a knowledge management project selection decision
framework designed by Captain William Bower and subsequently modified by 1st Lt
Jeffery Phillips, to determine if it was useful in identifying opportunities for applying
knowledge management in an Air Force organization. The framework will be referred to
as the Bower-Phillips decision framework. This literature review begins with an
overview of current literature in the areas of knowledge, knowledge management (KM),
influences affecting KM implementation, the role of technology, and KM in the military.
The chapter concludes with a description of the knowledge management project selection
decision framework developed by Captain William Bower and 1st Lt Jeffery Phillips.
What Is Knowledge?
Knowledge is defined simply as "actionable" information (Drucker, 1993;
Tiwana, 2000) which is embedded within the human mind or consciousness (Alavi &
Leidner, 2001; Brown & Duguid, 2002; Muller-Merbach, 2004; Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995) that provides one the capacity to make well informed decisions (Marchland,
Davenport, & Dickson, 2000).
Human knowledge can further be broken down into two kinds-- explicit and tacit.
Explicit knowledge is that knowledge which is easily captured and codified into a
communicable source external to one's mind. Nonaka describes explicit knowledge as
that which can be "expressed in words and numbers, and easily communicated and shared
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in the form of hard data, scientific formulae, codified procedures, or universal
procedures" (1995), a military technical order or instruction, for example.
Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is that which is still considered "trapped"
inside a person's head to be used only by them. It is "embedded in personnel experience,
complex [and] developed and internalized by the knower over a long period of time…"
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Tacit knowledge is considered the most difficult to
reproduce or communicate for use by others (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).

Data, Information, and Knowledge
Knowledge seems to be at the highest point in the hierarchy of data-informationknowledge as graphically depicted in Figure 1 (Alavi & Leidner, 1999b; Davenport &
Prusak, 1998; Firestone, 2001; Holsapple & Joshi, 2002; Kakabadse, Kakabadse, &
Kouzmin, 2003b; Lim & Ahmed, 2000; Tiwana, 2000; Vouros, 2003). Some academics
believe in the opposite "reversed hierarchy," or one which is "circular" in which
knowledge leads to data (Spiegler, 2000; Tuomi, 1999); while others still take the middle
ground and argue that both are true (King, 2001; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).

Data

Information

Knowledge

Figure 1. Data-Information-Knowledge Hierarchy
(Kakabadse, Kakabadse, & Kouzmin, 2003a)
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Data has been described as "a set of discrete, objective facts about events"
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998) or " a set of particular and objective facts about an event or
simply the structured record of a transaction (Tiwana, 2000). Therefore, data itself is not
directly meaningful. When one places data into a context which is meaningful, or
"interpreted data," it then becomes information (Vouros, 2003). The well-accepted
premise is that data is transformed into information after undergoing one of the five C's,
as detailed below and in depicted in Figure 2 (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Tiwana, 2000).
•

"Contextualized: we know for what purpose the data was gathered

•

Categorized: we know the units of analysis or key components of data

•

Calculated: the data may have been analyzed mathematically or statistically

•

Corrected: errors have been removed from the data

•

Condensed: the data may have been summarized in a more concise form"
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998)

Condensation

Contextualization

Categorization

Correction

Calculation

Information

Data

Figure 2. The Five C's that Differentiate Data from Information
(Tiwana, 2000)
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Some hold that knowledge is more valuable because it is information which can
be transformed into action (Alavi & Leidner, 1999b; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Vouros,
2003). Action refers to "measurable efficiencies," or "wiser decisions" and should be
evaluated as such (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Vouros, 2003). Much of the literature
uses the terms information and knowledge interchangeably and posit that information and
knowledge aren't radically different; information simply becomes knowledge once it is
processed in the mind of an individual (Alavi & Leidner, 1999b; Davenport & Prusak,
1998; Holsapple & Joshi, 2002; Vouros, 2003).
What Is Knowledge Management?
Knowledge management is an emerging discipline that holds promise for
organizations attempting to achieve the full potential and value of its knowledge
resources. As with any emerging concept, the details of knowledge management may be
fuzzy or confusing. KM is regarded to be among one of the fuzziest concepts in recent
times, with business and academic journals seeing a 100 percent increase, per year, in
KM articles (Despres & Chauvel, 2000).
Knowledge management involves the use of techniques, most often technological,
of providing an organization's knowledge resources for the use and resultant advantage of
the organization as a whole in the support of decision making (Alavi & Leidner, 2001;
Brown & Duguid, 2002; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; M. Earl & Scott, 2000; Holsapple &
Joshi, 2001; King, 2001; Murray, 2000; Roth, 2000).
Some of the benefits of managing knowledge include empowering members of an
organization with the ability to make the best decisions based upon the complete
8

knowledge base of the organization, using that knowledge base to formulate solutions to
an organization's problems and changing business environment, and, probably most
importantly, preventing the organization from making the same mistake twice (Davenport
& Prusak, 1998).
As the name implies, KM is not a technology issue (although technology is a key
enabler); it is a management issue. KM is more about the management of processes and
people than of technology. Efficient business processes are a result of a well-informed
organization, and empowering employees with knowledge enables the fine-tuning of
these processes. As will be seen in a later section, KM relies heavily on an organizational
culture which is driven by a "performance-linked-to-reward system" that encourages
knowledge workers to share what they know (Tiwana, 2000).
Information Management vs. Knowledge Management and the Role of Technology
A problem with KM is that most continue to confuse it with information
management. While information technology (IT) and information management are the
cornerstones to knowledge management they should not be confused. "The medium is
not the message, though it may strongly affect the message. The thing delivered is more
important that the delivery vehicle" (Davenport & Prusak, 1998: 4).
As touched on earlier, knowledge is different form information in the sense that
knowledge provides a mental framework one uses to evaluate and incorporate new
experiences and information in the process of making a decision. Knowledge, therefore,
is more difficult to manage than information because it's more difficult to "capture". This
is especially true with tacit knowledge which is still considered "stuck" within
9

individuals' heads. IT doesn't always provide a solution because knowledge management
requires the building of relationships and trust between people to allow for the flow of
knowledge and the sharing of personal experiences and this can occur without
technology.
Most KM efforts in the past have focused on codifying, archiving, and retrieving
needed information. This is considered an obvious misdirection of technological effort
that continues to confuse KM with information management (Roth, 2000). Knowledge
assets are more difficult to pin down and the mere introduction of technology won't
ensure these assets are accessible or usable. Advocates of KM assert that technology
should only be viewed as an enabler that allows explicit knowledge to be observable and
accessible while also allowing tacit knowledge to be identified and accessed through the
use of knowledge maps of an organization, collaboration tools, and on-line discussion
boards. Since the key knowledge resource of any organization is the human resource,
technology should be focused on creating relationships between these people.
Information technology (IT), then, becomes critical in achieving the relationship between
human resources to facilitate information and knowledge exchange (Malafsky, 2000).
Knowledge management systems have taken many forms and include expert
systems, artificial intelligence, and knowledge repositories (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).
The most prevalent knowledge management systems in industry have been knowledge
repositories (Alavi & Leidner, 1999a; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Wickramasinghe,
2002). A knowledge repository is simply the compilation of structured, explicit
knowledge--usually in the form of documents (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). A 1997
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study performed on 109 international companies claiming to have a knowledge
management system (KMS) showed that web-based technologies were taking the lead in
practice; these findings are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Percentage of Technologies/Tools used as Knowledge Management
Systems (KMS)
Browser
90%
Electronic mail
84%
Search/retrieval tools
73%
Information repositories
52%
WWW server
42%
Agents/Filters
36%
External server services
31%
Videoconferencing
23%
(Alavi & Leidner, 1999a)

The growing body of literature studying KMS implementation identifies some key
broad technological areas for successful explicit knowledge management--"database and
database management, communication and messaging, and browsing and retrieval"
(Alavi & Leidner, 1999b). All technologies should be focused on supporting the
knowledge management cycle graphically represented in Figure 3 (Alavi & Leidner,
1999b; Consulting, 2000; Davenport, Long, & Beers, 1998; Edenius & Borgerson, 2003;
M. W. Salisbury, 2003; Tiwana, 2000; Wickramasinghe, 2002).
Other technologies are necessary to access people with the desired tacit
knowledge that is necessary at any particular time. Commonly used are knowledge maps
or corporate yellow pages that members of an organization can access to identify those
with the needed knowledge (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).
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Create

Disseminate

Preserve

Figure 3. The Knowledge Management Cycle
(M. W. Salisbury, 2003)
Some organizations are concerned with the handling of their personal, sensitive,
or classified information especially in global organizations like the military. Modern
encryption methods now available to web-browsers enable dissemination of some of an
organization's most valuable resources while preventing unauthorized use or access
(Bhatt, Schulze, Hancke, & Horvath, 2003; Budai, 2004; Dassen et al., 2002; Lavery &
Boldyreff, 2001; Trinidad, 2002). The use of these security measures has facilitated
knowledge management at organizations that deal with what is considered to be "high
value" knowledge to include hospitals, the Department of Energy (DOE), and military
portals or on-line knowledge resources (Bartczak, 2002; M. W. Salisbury, 2003). A few
academics advocate against codifying tacit knowledge to prevent unauthorized disclosure
(Bloodgood & Salisbury, 2002; W. D. Salisbury & Gopal, 2003). Recent events at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory, in which computer disks containing highly classified
information were found to be missing, may be a case in point of the dangers of codifying
tacit scientific knowledge (CNN, 2004).
12

Knowledge Management Participation Enablers and Barriers
Many factors contribute to the success or lack of success of knowledge
management. A number of issues that act as enablers or barriers to KM are presented
throughout current literature. The most prevalent issues that affect KM participation
within organizations include understanding the organization's corporate strategy, whether
it's culture is one of sharing or hoarding information/knowledge, how receptive it's people
are to change, and the values and relationships between the people within the
organization (Ardichvili, Page, & Wentling, 2003; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Tiwana,
2000; M. Zack, 1999).
As a starting point for all KM initiates, it is suggested that an organization
perform a "knowledge audit" to identify critical knowledge areas and vulnerabilities
based upon it's corporate strategy (Koulopoulos & Frappaolo, 2001; Tiwana, 2000; M.
Zack, 1999). A knowledge strategy would be the ultimate product of the audit. This
strategy could ensure that critical knowledge resources are properly focused to achieve
the overall strategy of the business or organization (M. Zack, 1999).
Upon identifying a knowledge strategy for the organization, the practitioner next
needs to achieve a better understanding of the organizational culture. The culture will
make or break any knowledge sharing initiative no matter the money spent on it or
technology applied (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Tiwana, 2000). The ideal culture would
be one that shares openly, realizes all members are active participants, discourages
knowledge hoarding behaviors, builds relationships and trust, and has senior
management's support (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Nonaka &
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Takeuchi, 1995; Tiwana, 2000). Some sactors that influence knowledge sharing and
ultimately KM implementation and KMS participation by its members are shown in
Table 2.
Not surprisingly the crucial element of any KM initiative is a thorough
understanding of the people of an organization and their personal knowledge. Those
working with artificial intelligence and expert-based systems have found it hard to
replace the power of people's minds and the knowledge within them. Companies have
been known to spend considerable dollars to build systems that "proved to be 80 to 85
percent as accurate as the two-second human glance" (Davenport & Prusak, 1998: 127).
Table 2. Enablers and Barriers to Knowledge Sharing:
Enablers
Barriers
High levels of trust
Fear and suspicion
Rewards for sharing
Unintentionally rewarded for hoarding
Team-based collaborative work
Individual effort without recognition and
reward
Aligned mission, vision and values, and
Individual accountability and reward
strategy
Joint team-wide accountability and rewards Functional focus
Group accountability and rewards
Employee-owner interest conflicts
Process focus
Lack of alignment
Focus on customer satisfaction
Not-invented-here syndrome
Open to outside ideas
Too busy to share
Eye on competition
Internal competition
Collaborative and cross-functional work
Incompatible IT
Need to share
Compartmentalization of functional groups
Localized decision making
Centralized top-down decision making
(Tiwana, 2000)

An organization wishing to implement a KMS, thereby attempting to tap into and
use all of its knowledge resources, would be wise to carefully select information
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technologies suited for the level of expertise and technology acceptance of its users
(Davenport et al., 1998; Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Money & Turner, 2004).
Knowledge Management in the Military
The current threat environment for the Department of Defense is like none
previously encountered. The enemies being fought today are those that rely on unique
autonomous organizational structures that lack military bases, air fields, or
distinguishable uniforms. The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently undergoing a
massive transformation to account for this shift in military affairs (Director, 2003a; Navy,
2003). Lessons learned from recent conflicts indicate that great emphasis must be given
to the concept of network-centric warfare and knowledge management (Director, 2003b).
Our enemies have the capacity to achieve some of the same technological
advantages that we currently do to include computer technologies, robust communication
networks, and successful information operations (R. S. Earl & Emery, 2003). To counter
these threats the DoD must embrace technological advances that will propel them to the
next level, specifically the leveraging of the collective knowledge of the total force to
achieve synergistic decision superiority (Defense, 2000).
A theme consistent throughout each of the service's transformation roadmaps is
the need for knowledge management to ensure that all members are capable of making
the best decisions possible in the face of an ever-changing threat environment (AF/CIO,
2002; Army, 2003; HQ-USAF/XPXC, 2003; Navy, 2003). This decision ability is
consistent with the expressed desire within Joint Vision 2020 that "information
superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when it is effectively
15

translated into superior knowledge and decisions" (Director for Strategic Plans and
Policy, 2000). Superior weapons, weapon delivery systems, technology, and other
material items are no longer sufficient, in themselves, in sustaining a superior military
force.
The DoD is not alone in this effort; almost all government agencies are
undergoing forms of transformation in response to national security threats. The 9/11
Commission tasked with identifying deficiencies in infrastructure which failed to prevent
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon the United States concluded that the FBI
"did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the field," action
officers didn't have the ability to draw on "all available knowledge about al Qaeda," and
the Commission recognized the immediate need for a single agency to act as an
"authoritative knowledge bank, bringing information to bear on common plans"
(Commission, 2004).
A Framework for Knowledge Management Project Selection
Both Bower's and Phillips' research provide a framework for selecting KM
projects based on factors identified in the research conducted by each. The project
selection decision framework is intended to guide the identification, selection, and
eventual implementation of knowledge management projects within the Air Force. The
Delphi studies conducted to create the overall framework included senior knowledge
managers from across the Department of Defense (DoD), therefore its use across the DoD
is warranted (Bower, 2001). This specific framework was chosen as the basis for this
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study because Bower recommended that its theoretical basis be tested in a field
environment.
7-Step KM Project Selection Decision Process Framework
The original framework introduced by Bower consisted of six (6) steps. Phillips
added an additional step but labeled it Step 2b. To prevent confusion, this effort renumbered the steps one through seven (1-7).
The framework was constructed and deemed to be important because it "serves as
a guide for identifying, categorizing, and understanding the myriad ideas, issues, and
interrelated components underlying and supporting a complex construct or phenomena, in
this case knowledge management" (Bower, 2001). It can be used to guide and support
the decision-making process for selecting KM projects that support the organization's
goals. The structure of the framework is such that it provides a user-friendly decision
flow diagram context for those who may be unfamiliar with the concept of knowledge
management. The 7-Steps are:
•

Step 1: Analyze Corporate Strategic Objectives Using SWOT (Strengths,
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) Methodology

•

Step 2: Identify & Analyze Potential Knowledge Management Opportunities

•

Step 3: Identify and Analyze Cultural Aspects of the Organization

•

Step 4: Identify & Address Potential Knowledge Management Projects

•

Step 5: Identify & Address Knowledge Management Project Variables Affecting
Project Implementation & Success
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•

Step 6: Identify & Address Success Factors For Project Variables Affecting the
Successful Implementation of Knowledge Management Projects

•

Step 7: Finalize Knowledge Management Project Selection
These seven (7) steps will each be explored more fully to provide an

understanding of what is anticipated from an organization using the framework.
Step 1: Analyze Corporate Strategic Objectives Using SWOT (Strengths,
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) Methodology (Bower, 2001)
This step begins with an analysis of the organization’s overarching strategic
vision, plan, and objectives using a standard Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and
Threats (SWOT) methodology and concludes with an identification of key considerations
(factors) that must be resolved prior to project implementation to ensure success. The
ultimate result of Step 1 is to decide whether or not knowledge management can provide
a strategic advantage to the organization. The goal is to identify the overall current
knowledge management vision, strategy and initiatives within the organization. One
method to identify these is to perform a SWOT analysis.
A SWOT analysis is an assessment of an organization's strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats (SWOT) based upon their current business posture and
environment. The SWOT analysis could assist an organization in identifying the
organization's knowledge gap (what they need to know) and strategic gap (what they
need to be able to do). A number of factors affect this decision process include the
corporate or organizational strategic objectives, knowledge required to achieve these
objectives, and a corporate or organizational knowledge vision and strategy.
18

During this step it is important to investigate the current and future information
and knowledge requirements of the organization and to identify potential opportunities in
which the organization can capitalize and leverage its existing organizational knowledge.
Step 2: Identify & Analyze Potential Knowledge Management
Opportunities (Bower, 2001)
The analysis in Step 1 is utilized here in Step 2 to identify potential knowledge
management opportunities and limitations as they relate to the organization’s strategic
goals and objectives. In this step an analysis of the SWOT findings from Step 1 is
performed to identify specific areas where KM can assist in closing the organizations
knowledge gap and aid in achieving a strategic advantage for the organization. The
knowledge gap will be based on the types of knowledge needed to achieve the
organization's strategic objectives and the usability and availability of the information to
be used to support the potential KM objectives.
A few of the major factors to consider in this step include identifying and
analyzing current business processes for potential knowledge management opportunities
and an in-depth valuation process of current organizational knowledge (tacit & explicit)
to determine current worth and potential to capitalize on existing knowledge to create
more value for the organization. Also in this step the availability and usability of current
organizational knowledge (tacit & explicit) should be reviewed for possible opportunities
of exploitation. Examples of these would be to identify whether or not knowledge is
readily available and usable in its current state (i.e. tacit knowledge not identified or
shared, explicit knowledge supporting core business processes not readily available to
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potential users) and the potential loss of critical organizational knowledge (i.e. personnel
are due to retire or separate from the military, etc.), etc.
The organization should look at its current structure to see if it will readily
support and utilize knowledge management initiatives. Some areas for investigation
include and examination of the current structure and whether it's conducive to knowledge
sharing (do boundaries limit or inhibit the flow and transfer of knowledge?), a review of
the existing IT infrastructure and whether it's aligned to support knowledge management
activities and initiatives (current and future state; KM initiatives are heavily reliant on IT
for information gathering, storage, and transfer and infrastructure must support initial
knowledge management initiatives and be robust/dynamic enough to meet future
demand), and a thorough review of organizational resources available for knowledge
management initiatives (manpower, equipment (primarily IT), funding, a footprint
(space), and funding).
Step 3: Identify and Analyze Cultural Aspects of the Organization
This additional step to the original decision framework is provided by the research
effort of 1st Lt Jeffrey Phillips and is referred to as Step 3 (Phillips, 2003). Lt Phillips
evaluated the decision framework proposed by Captain Bower and adapted it by
including specific culture aspects of an organization that may affect attempts of
implementing knowledge management. A Delphi panel concluded that organization
culture factors should be considered to assist in the decision of whether or not the culture
is "knowledge friendly." Identified factors include communication, team orientation,
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trust, conflict, leadership support, learning, adaptability, tolerance for risk, and a strong
and positive culture. Each will be covered in greater detail.
Communication
Phillips contends that open channels of communication are extremely important in
an organization attempting to implement KM. Effective communication should exist
between an organizations senior management and its members as well as between distinct
organizational functions, divisions, and individuals. An organization that doesn't
communicate well will have difficulty trying to implement KM.
Team Orientation
A team is a group of organizational personnel associated to achieve a common
goal. According to Phillips, organizations that value and have been known to encourage
teamwork in achieving its goals have had greater success in the adoption of KM.
Trust
Simply put, trust is the faith one places in the character, ability, strength, or truth
of someone or something. Phillips found that organizations that have had successful KM
initiatives reported a greater amount of trust between individuals. Trust will promote an
atmosphere that is more favorable for the sharing of information, experience, and
knowledge.
Conflict
Although some level of conflict may be healthy, excessive competitive or
opposing struggle can be damaging to an organization. Phillips found that intense debate
can lead to innovation while competition between individuals may prohibit a trustful
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relationship therefore hindering the openness required for information and knowledge
sharing. According to Phillips, organizations that report low levels of conflict have had
greater success in implementing KM initiatives.
Leadership Support
As with any change initiative the organization's leadership has the responsibility
to promote and instill a corporate vision and direction. Phillips' study found that KM
initiatives are no different and require arguably even greater leadership involvement since
some KM issues are nebulous concepts. Some large corporations have gone to great
lengths to promote KM including the creation of the position of Chief Knowledge Officer
(CKO), to lead and guide the use of an organization's knowledge resources.
Learning
Organizations that place a greater value on learning have greater success in
implementing KM initiatives, according to Phillips. Learning is the passing of an
individual's expertise and personal knowledge to others in the organization both on and
off duty.
Adaptability
The ability of an organization to modify its behavior in the face of change is
important to all organizations not just those wishing to implement KM. It has been
suggested by Phillips that organizations that can adapt more readily to organizational
change are more likely to succeed in implementing KM.
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Tolerance for Risk
Phillips found that the propensity an organization has towards taking risk is very
telling of its culture. Risk taking is synonymous to experimentation and well-intentioned
errors and failures. Organizations that have a low propensity for taking risk will punish
employees that try something new and fail. Knowledge and learning initiatives have a
greater chance for success in organizations that tolerate well-intentioned risk taking.
A Strong and Positive Culture
A strong and positive culture is one where employees share common values, have
high morale, and are committed to organizational goals. A strong and positive
organizational culture will "self-police" and exact more influence upon the organization's
members performance. These environments have greater success implementing KM
practices(Phillips, 2003).
Step 4: Identify & Address Potential Knowledge Management Projects
This step aims to identify specific KM projects that can capitalize on the
organization's potential KM opportunities by addressing the existing and future potential
limitations identified in Step 2 and the cultural factors addressed in Step 3. Potential KM
projects should be tied to the key business processes identified in Step 2.
Any effort should be one that is focused on people and the organizational
processes and not the technology. Any knowledge management
efforts/initiatives/projects should have a detailed scope and desired outcome. In order to
do this it is important to define the knowledge to be utilized by the knowledge
management effort and ensure this knowledge is tied directly to knowledge valuation
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process performed in Step 2. It is recommended that a common taxonomy of terms
(common language) be developed to ensure everyone is operating off of the same page
and have the same understanding of knowledge management definitions, desired
outcomes, goals, milestones, metrics, and expectations.
Step 5: Identify & Address Knowledge Management Project Variables
Affecting Project Implementation & Success
This step will assist in identifying whether or not there's a good probability that a
KM project will succeed. It specifically identifies certain project variables affecting the
implementation and success of the project as identified in KM literature. One important
factor throughout the entire KM selection process is that of senior leadership interest and
project sponsorship. Knowledge management project sponsorship and active
participation and involvement from senior leadership are vital to any KM initiative.
Requirements of the knowledge management effort/project should be defined and include
specifics on how to capture and codify desired knowledge, how this knowledge will be
shared, accessed, and reutilized, and ultimately how new knowledge will be created
through collaboration and knowledge sharing.
Also included in this step is the need to develop project goals, expected outcomes
and performance measures. Performance measures/metrics can be used to tie daily
organization activities to the overall strategic objectives.
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Step 6: Identify & Address Success Factors For Project Variables Affecting
the Successful Implementation of Knowledge Management Projects
This step will aid in identifying success factors for the project variables identified
in the previous step, Step 5. For example, one variable investigated under Step 5 was
senior leadership interest and project sponsorship. Success factors for these variables
would be the need for continued active participation and involvement from senior
leadership and the need for an appointed knowledge management champion and project
sponsor.
Also with this step is the need to ensure the knowledge management project
selected could provide substantial and measurable value to the organization. To ensure
active participation by organizational members it's recommended that employee
compensation be structured to encourage employee utilization. Compensation doesn't
necessarily need to be financial (financial compensation in the military isn't reasonable);
forms of compensation can include recognition, awards, higher ratings on performance
appraisals/reports, etc. These efforts are intended to promote the sharing and utilization
of organizational knowledge.
Policy and guidance that governs KM use may need to be developed to support
and encourage acceptance under this step. Policy and guidelines should promote the
creation, sharing, and utilization of organizational knowledge bases. Factors that
potentially impact the identification and mapping of knowledge repositories should also
be identified and addressed.
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Chapter Overview
This chapter provided an overview of the scholarly literature to support the
theoretical foundation for this research effort and was intended to provide a meaningful
resource for the sponsor of the study. Covered in this chapter included a general review
of knowledge, knowledge management (KM), technological issues associated with KM,
influences and barriers of KM, and a thorough review of the KM research framework
identified for this study.
Researchers responsible for creating the theoretical Bower-Phillips decision
framework recommended that the framework be used in a real-world field environment to
validate the concepts presented. This study will take the adapted framework and examine
its usefulness in the real-world setting of an organization attempting to identify and
implement KM. The next chapter, Chapter III, will detail the research methodology
chosen for this study and detail how the study was performed.
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III. Methodology
Overview
This chapter describes the methodology used to conduct this research.
Specifically this chapter will describe the case study design, explain why the case study
methodology is appropriate for this effort, and address the type of data collected and
describe how these data will be analyzed to answer the research question presented.
Case Study Research
Robert Yin defines the appropriateness of case study as a research method by
providing the following technical definition:
"A case study is an empirical inquiry that:
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,
especially when
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident"
(Yin, 2003: 13)
Paul Leedy also advocates the use of a case study in situations when "its unique or
exceptional qualities can promote understanding or inform practice for similar
situations," and "a case study may be especially suitable for learning more about a little
known or poorly understood situation" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001: 149).
Knowledge management implementation in specific Air Force organizations is a
poorly understood phenomenon and the Bower-Phillips decision framework may be
helpful in assisting organizations in efforts to identify and select potential KM
opportunities. An explanatory case study was required to test the usability, or validity, of
the designed framework in a real-world setting.
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Also as part of this methodology, “because phenomenon and context are not
always distinguishable in real-life situations, a whole set of other technical
characteristics, including data collection and data analysis, now become the second part
of our technical definition” (Yin, 2003: 13):
The case study inquiry:
•
•
•

copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a
triangulating fashion, and as another result
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data
collection and analysis (Yin, 2003: 13-14).

Therefore, “the case study as a research strategy comprises an all-encompassing
method—with the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to
data analysis” (Yin, 2003: 14).
Form of Research Question
A qualitative research approach is appropriate for investigating "how" and "what"
questions given the researcher wishes to "gain insights about the nature of a particular
phenomenon, develop new concepts or theoretical perspectives about the phenomenon,
and/or discover the problems that exist within the phenomenon," ((Leedy & Ormrod,
2001: 149; Yin, 2003). A qualitative approach also allows "a researcher to test the
validity of certain assumptions, claims, theories, or generalizations within real-world
contexts" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001: 150)
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Since the purpose of this research was to explain why, or why not, the BowerPhillips decision framework was useful in a real-world setting, "how" questions were
appropriate to allow for these explanations.
Components of Case Study Research Design
To ensure the chosen case study methodology provides meaningful results,
proponents of case study research advocate the use of specific design criteria. Yin
identifies five components that are critically important; these five components are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

a study’s questions,
its propositions, if any,
its unit(s) of analysis,
the logic linking the data to the propositions, and
the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003: 21)

These criteria will be outlined in greater detail, as they relate to this case study, in
the respective sections below.
Study’s Questions.
This research effort was based upon the Bower-Phillips decision framework for
identifying knowledge management projects as detailed in (Bower, 2001) and (Phillips,
2003). The only research question for this study was designed from the framework
selected for the study and was intended to provide explanatory feedback on the actual
usability and comprehensiveness of the framework in a real-world setting.
Research Question.
How well does the Bower-Phillips decision framework support an organization's
decision making process for selecting specific knowledge management (KM) projects?
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Study Proposition.
As outlined by Yin, "each proposition directs attention to something that should
be examined within the scope of study" (Yin, 2003). The proposition is that the BowerPhillips framework will provide a usable means of identifying and selecting KM projects.
This effort will explain how it assists, or fails to assist, in the decision making process of
identifying and selecting these projects.
Unit(s) of Analysis.
Another vital component to case study research is that of determining just what
the "case" is (Yin, 2003). This "case" is known as the unit, or units, of which one is to
study or analyze. The unit of analysis in this study was a single squadron within the Air
Force; specifically, the 738th Engineering Installation Squadron (EIS), Keesler Air Force
Base (AFB), Mississippi. This squadron is an organization consisting of both military
and civilian employees.
Logic Linking Data to Proposition.
Linking the findings of the study to the established propositions are considered by
Yin to be "the least developed in case studies"(Yin, 2003). He continues that "one
promising approach for case studies is the idea of 'pattern matching' described by Donald
Campbell (Campbell, 1975), whereby several pieces of information from the same case
may be related to some theoretical proposition" (Yin, 2003). This is consistent with
Leedy's recommendation, "ultimately the researcher must look for convergence
(triangulation) of the data: Many separate pieces of information must point to the same
conclusion" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001: 150). Consistent with these advocates numerous
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sources of data were collected based upon the factors outlined within the Bower-Phillips
decision framework. A majority of these data came from structured interviews with
squadron personnel. Other data included commander mission briefings, squadron
pamphlets, internal documents, commander's briefings, Air Force Instructions (AFIs), Air
Force Material Command Instructions (AFMCIs), and newspaper/media
interviews/articles.
Criteria for Interpreting the Findings.
Proponents of case study research suggest that "currently, there is no precise way
of setting the criteria for interpreting these types of findings"(Yin, 2003), and that "a case
study researcher often begins to analyze the data during the data collection process;
preliminary conclusions are likely to influence the kind of data that he or she seeks out
and collects in later parts of the study" (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). To aid the researcher in
interpreting the findings and reaching conclusions based upon the proposition of the
study it is recommended to collect extensive data on the event on which the investigation
is focused (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). The data collected for this study were tabulated,
grouped according to the Key Factors Affecting the Decision Process of the BowerPhillips decision framework, and conclusions were based upon these findings.
Conduct of Research
The overall quality of case study research is dependent upon certain criteria to
ensure the method is reliable and valid. This section will address the issues applicable to
case study research design.

31

Testing of Existing Theory
This research will test the existing theory of the Bower-Phillips decision
framework. Therefore, the framework will provide the guidance for the design of this
study and ensure relevant data are collected. This is consistent with Yin, "for some
topics, existing works may provide a rich framework for designing a specific case study"
(2003: 29).
Analytic Generalization
This qualitative approach will serve as a means of interpretation and verification
of the Bower-Phillips decision framework (Bower, 2001; Phillips, 2003). Leedy and
Ormrod offer the following definitions:
Interpretation. …enable[s] a researcher to (a) gain insights about the nature of a
particular phenomenon, (b) develop new concepts or theoretical perspectives
about the phenomenon, and/or (c) discover problems that exist within the
phenomenon.
Verification. …allow[s] a researcher to test the validity of certain assumptions,
claims, theories, or generalizations within real-world contexts (Leedy & Ormrod,
2001: 148).
The Bower-Phillips decision framework will be used as a template to facilitate
data collection and provide a foundation for what Yin describes as "analytic
generalization," further defined as that where "a previously developed theory is used as a
template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study" (2004: 32). Yin
continues that "the use of theory, in doing case studies, is not only an immense aid in
defining the appropriate research design and data collection but also becomes the main
vehicle for generalizing the results of the case study" (2003: 33).
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Framing the Research
It has been found that "initial hunches begin the process of bounding and framing
the research, of establishing the parameters and developing a perspective through the
conceptual framework" (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). The researcher had initial hunches
about the validity of the Bower-Phillips decision framework. The framework appeared to
possess face validity upon accomplishing the literature review, but it still needed to be
tested in a real world setting.
Research Design Characteristics
Single-Case Study
This was a single-case study with a unit of the Air Force as the unit of analysis.
Context for this study was the Bower-Phillips decision framework for identifying and
selecting knowledge management opportunities. The case, and therefore the unit of
analysis, was the 738th Engineering Installation Squadron.
Yin offers numerous rationales for selecting a single case, the first being "when it
represents the critical case in testing a well-formulated theory" another being that the
case is "a representative or typical case" (2003). The key to this research is the testing of
the theory within the Bower-Phillips decision framework in an Air Force organization.
For this purpose, the 738th EIS may be considered to be a typical active duty Air Force
organization, consisting of enlisted and officer military personnel and government
civilian employees.
A third rationale provided by Yin for the selection of a single case study is "the
revelatory case...when an investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyze a
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phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation" (Yin, 2004: 42). The
framework selected for this study has never been tested for usability in a real-world
context. As the Air Force attempts to advocate the use of knowledge management there
is a need for a usable framework to assist organizations in identifying potential KM
opportunities.
Desired Skills of the Case Study Researcher
Certain skills are desired of case study investigators for successful study
completion and legitimate results. Yin outlines these desired skills as:
•
•
•
•

•

A good case study investigator should be able to ask good questions--and
interpret the answers.
An investigator should be a good 'listener' and not be trapped by his or her
own ideologies or preconceptions.
An investigator should be adaptive and flexible, so that newly encountered
situations can be seen as opportunities, not threats.
An investigator must have a firm grasp of the issues being studied,
whether this is a theoretical or policy orientation, even if in an exploratory
mode. Such a grasp reduces the relevant events and information to be
sought to manageable proportions.
A person should be unbiased by preconceived notions, including those
derived from theory. Thus, a person should be sensitive and responsive to
contradictory evidence (Yin, 2003: 59).

Further, and important for this research effort, the researcher "[would] need to
demonstrate that they [could] conduct the research in such a way that neither the setting
nor the people in it [were] harmed" (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). Care was taken to
prevent harm to current and future EIS missions through either disclosing strengths or
weaknesses to current posture or policy. Care was taken to ensure nothing classified or
sensitive was released and that the anonymity of those individuals that volunteered to
participate was protected.
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Research Design Quality
Yin proposes that the quality of a research design can be judged according to
certain logical tests (2003). Four of the better known tests are outlined by Kidder and
Judd (1986) as referenced in Yin:
•
•

•
•

Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts
being studied
Internal validity (for explanatory or causal studies only, and not for descriptive or
exploratory studies): establishing a casual relationship, whereby certain
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious
relationships
External validity: establishing the domain to which a studies findings can be
generalized
Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study--such as the data
collection procedures--can be repeated, with the same results (Yin, 2003).
Each of these will be addressed in detail and tactics to achieve each can be

reviewed in Table 3.
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Table 3. Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests
As adopted from COSMOS Corporation as referenced in (Yin, 2003)
Tests
Construct Validity

Case Study Tactic
•
•
•

Internal Validity

External Validity

•
•
•
•
•
•

Reliability

•
•

Use of multiple sources
of evidence
Establish chain of
evidence
Have key informants
review draft case study
report
Do pattern-matching
Do explanation-building
Address rival
explanations
Use logic models
Use theory in single-case
studies
Use replication logic in
multiple-case studies
Use case study protocol
Develop case study
database

Phase of research in which
tactic occurs
Data collection
Data collection
Composition

Data analysis
Data analysis
Data analysis
Data analysis
Research design
Research design
Data collection
Data collection

Construct validity
Consistent with Table 3 and as discussed previously, to achieve construct validity
multiple sources of data were collected. Primary data collection included commander
mission briefings, internal documents, Air Force and Air Force Material Command
policy documents, newspaper/on-line articles, and structured interviews. These multiple
sources assisted with the desired effect of "triangulation" in which convergence of the
data assists in achieving the same conclusion (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). Another means
of achieving construct validity was through establishing a chain of evidence. The
purpose of this chain of evidence "is to allow an external observer--in this situation, the
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reader of the case study--to follow the derivation of any evidence, ranging from initial
research questions to ultimate case study conclusions" (Yin, 2003). This requirement
was partially fulfilled through the use of a case study database, in which all data collected
were logged, categorized, and digitally stored. Finally, all interviewee's comments used
as part of this study were transcribed and submitted back to them for their final approval.
This ensured their answers were not misinterpreted or incorrect. (Exception: those that
participated in the pilot study did not receive a transcribed interview; those interviews
were conducted solely to assist in formulating interview questions for the main study.)
Also, each respondent was provided with a copy of the final report for review.
Internal validity
Yin offers two possible methods to ensure the internal validity of case study
research: 1) pattern-matching and 2) key informant cross-checking (Yin, 2003). Patternmatching was used to analyze interview transcripts and other data. Upon completion of
the study key informants of the 738th EIS were provided a copy of the findings of the
study for review, feedback, and a cross-check of the facts.
External validity
External validity "deals with the problem of knowing whether a study's findings
are generalizable beyond the immediate case study" (Yin, 2003). Case study research
relies on analytical generalization in which the researcher strives to generalize a
particular set of rules to a broader theory (Yin, 2003). In this case external validity is
provided through use of the theory and decision framework for selecting potential
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knowledge management opportunities provided by the Bower-Phillips decision
framework.
Reliability
Reliability of a study allows for a future investigator to arrive at the same
conclusions and findings of the first investigator when performing the same case study
over again. Yin contends that "the ultimate goal of reliability is to minimize the errors
and biases of the study"(Yin, 2003). Yin suggests establishing a case study protocol and
the development of a case study database; these are covered in greater detail in a later
section.
Limitations of the Design
One serious limitation of this case study was that there was only one researcher.
Yin identifies numerous researchers are beneficial in data collection when:
1. a single case calls for intensive data collection at the same site, requiring a
"team" of investigators;
2. a case study involves multiple cases, with different persons being needed to
cover each site or rotate to the others sites; or
3. a combination of the first two conditions (Yin, 2003)
Only one researcher was available to travel to conduct data collection for this case
study over the course of two days. All of the data collection and interviews were
performed by the single researcher at the site selected for the study. Some interviews, at
a very last resort, were performed by telephone and/or electronic mail. Care was taken to
carefully plan the site visit given the fact that proponents of case study research agree that
a single case study researcher may be sufficient if a sound methodology and a well
designed case study exist prior to data collection (Yin, 2003).
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Conducting the Research
Case Study Protocol
Prior to any data collection for this study a case study protocol was established
(Yin, 2003). A protocol can simply be equated to a data gathering "roadmap." The main
purpose of the protocol was to ensure the researcher stayed focused on the subject of the
case study and the preparation of the protocol forced the researcher to anticipate
unforeseen issues (Yin, 2003). The protocol for this study began with an investigation of
the Bower-Philips decision framework and specific knowledge management concepts
identified during the literature review.
Yin recommends that a case study protocol contain the following sections, all
of which are included within this research effort:
•
•
•
•

An overview of the case study project (project objectives and auspices, case study
issues, and relevant readings about the topic being investigated)
Field procedures (presentation of credentials, access to the case study 'sites,'
general sources of information, and procedural reminders)
Case study questions (the specific questions that the case study investigator must
keep in mind in collecting data, 'table shells' for specific arrays of data, and
potential sources of information for answering each question)
A guide for the case study report (outline, format for data, use and presentation of
other documentation, and bibliographical information) (Yin, 2003).
Pilot Investigation
A pilot case study is also a recommendation of Yin (2003) to assist with refining

data collection plans. Due to timing constraints, a pilot study was not possible or
practical. However, this study began with two pilot interviews which were selected as a
matter of convenience. The informants were previous work acquaintances of the
researcher from the 738th EIS. These interviews were conducted over the telephone and
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key data were provided via email. These informants proved to be extremely beneficial
and assisted in the refining of the overall case study protocol and data collection plan.
The interviews were also instrumental in identifying key personnel for interviews,
initially overlooked sources of data, and specific projects that were underway that could
be of interest for this study. The informants used in the pilot interviews, although from
the same unit, were not the same used in the actual case study.
Coordination for Case Study Interviewees
Upon determination of the unit of analysis, the commander of the 738th EIS was
contacted directly. He then provided a single point of contact for the study and ensured
full support from his staff as the study progressed. Coordination for the nine (9)
interviews that were conducted was provided through this single point of contact. While
on-site, and as the study progressed, interviews led to potential other key informants.
The organization was extremely flexible and provided all personnel needed for
interviews, even though a hurricane threatened the base and hurricane preparations were
underway.
Human Experimentation Requirements
Consistent with the requirements of the Air Force Institute of Technology, an
exemption letter was filed with the Human Subjects Review Board and was based on the
Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101, paragraph (b)(2), which
states:
Research activities in which the only involvement of human subjects will be in
one or more of the following categories are exempt from this policy: (2) Research
involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude,
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achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public
behavior.
Additionally, in accordance with these guidelines information obtained weren't
recorded in such a manner that human subjects could be identified, directly or through
identifiers linked to the subjects nor would any disclosure of the human subjects'
responses outside the research reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil
liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
Primary means for data collection was through structured audio-taped interviews. All
subjects were asked to volunteer to participate in the interview process and signed a letter
of consent containing a copy of the Privacy Act Statement of 1974. No adverse action
was taken against those who choose not to participate. Subjects were made aware of the
nature and purpose of the research, sponsors of the research, and disposition of the
interview results. Those who chose to participate were interviewed and audiotape
recorded using a micro cassette recorder, transcribed, then presented to the interviewee,
electronically through the use of email, for their final approval. No identifying
information obtained during interviews was retained or reported. Additional individual
data pertinent to the study included duty title and duration in current position, which
facilitated analysis and follow up throughout the study only.
Data Collection Techniques
Data for this study came from many sources (Yin, 2003). The majority of data for
the study came from nine (9) structured interviews with a purposive sampling of
squadron personnel (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Other data included commander mission
briefings, squadron pamphlets, internal documents, AFIs, AFMCIs, OIs, and
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newspaper/media interviews/articles. As stated earlier, multiple sources of evidence
support validity by converging on the same set of facts or findings (Yin, 2003).
The core data for this effort came from the interviews; these interviews consisted
of structured questions that focused primarily upon the framework itself and the Key
Factors Affecting Decision Process within each step of the Bower-Phillips decision
framework. The researcher interviewed four (4) civilians with an average of 18.25 years
of EI experience and five (5) military personnel with an average of 2.9 years of EI
experience. The researcher traveled to the 738th EIS on 13 September-14 September
2004 to conduct the interviews on site. Each interviewee reviewed a handout of the
framework (Appendix B) then read and signed a letter of consent and a letter authorizing
the use of direct quotes from their interview. The interviews were transcribed, placed
into the findings of the study, and emailed to each individual for review and final
approval for use. Published documents such as Air Force Instructions, Major Command
(MAJCOM) policy guidelines, and 738th EIS mission information were downloaded
from various AF websites.
An electronic case study database was established to manage the data collected.
The database was instrumental in organizing the raw data and tracking the established
points of contact (POC) from the site. The raw data were organized as a means to
facilitate independent inspection by those other than the researcher. All personal data
were scrubbed from the interviews to ensure confidentiality.
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Data Analysis Strategy
Case study data analysis, strategies and techniques are among some of the least
developed of the research methods (Yin, 2003). To assist in overcoming these
difficulties, it is advised to have analytic strategy that attempts to define the priorities of
what to analyze and why (Yin, 2003). The strategy chosen for this effort was "relying on
theoretical propositions" as prescribed in the Bower-Phillips decision framework (Yin,
2003). The analysis began early in the process while developing the research question
from this framework and data gathering was also based upon the theory presented within
the framework.
The general data analysis technique selected for this case study was pattern
matching (Yin, 2003). The theoretical Bower-Phillips decision framework guided the
data collection and the data were categorized accordingly based upon the steps, and Key
Decisions Affecting the Decision Process, within the framework. A conceptually
clustered matrix of categories based on the Key Factors Affecting Decision Process
within each step of the framework was created (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data from
any of the sources that matched the categories of the framework were placed in their
respective category for examination, analysis, and final conclusions. These are reported
in the following chapter.
A final portion of the analysis was provided by feedback from the squadron
commander upon his review of the findings. The framework was established to assist in
the decision making process of whether or not to proceed with KM. Therefore, the data
gathered using the Bower-Phillips decision framework as part of this study will be
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analyzed to see how well it supported the squadron's decision process in selecting KM
projects.
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IV. Results and Analysis
Chapter Overview
This chapter will begin with a description of demographics of the 738th EIS.
Then, using the theoretical decision framework under study, the data will be categorized
and analyzed. The data will be conceptually organized within the steps and Key Factors
Affecting the Decision Process of the decision framework to assess the frameworks realworld usefulness. The chapter will conclude with the answering of the research question.
Unless otherwise noted, the majority of data used for this study came from semistructured interviews with the squadron personnel.
The 738th Engineering and Installation Squadron (EIS)
The 738th Engineering Installation Squadron (EIS) based at Keesler Air Force
Base, Mississippi is subordinate to the 38th Engineering Group, Tinker Air Force Base,
Oklahoma. Aligned under the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), its mission is to
provide engineering and installation of integrated command, control, communications,
and computer (C4) systems for the Air Force and other government agencies worldwide
(Baca, 2004a).
The 738 EIS is the only remaining active duty engineering installation squadron
in the Air Force. The squadron provides a rapid response force that can deploy personnel
and resources within 48 hours to assess damage, engineer, install and reconstitute
command, control, communication and computer systems worldwide. This same
capability is utilized for quick reaction taskings and other engineering installation
requests that meet training requirements for their wartime mission. The squadron also
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boasts a one-of-a-kind specialized engineering function that investigates radio frequency
interference, measures electromagnetic radiation hazards, and performs tests to determine
protection from high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. The engineers also evaluate, provide
advice and resolve problems on all type of communications, as well as power, grounding,
and lightning protection systems. The 738 EIS also acts as an advisor to an additional
nineteen (19) Air National Guard Engineering and Installation (E&I) units. The unit is
currently structured into three flights: Rapid Response Flight, Specialized Engineering
Flight, and Mission Support Flight.

Figure 4. 738th Engineering Installation Squadron Organizational Chart
(Baca, 2004b)
Rapid Response Flight (RRF)
The Rapid Response Flight is further broken down into two sections as
graphically indicated in Figure 4: Electronic Systems (RRFR) and Cable and Antenna
Systems (RRFC). The flight provides combat installation teams trained and equipped to
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install C4 systems for both peacetime and contingency operations. They are capable of
deploying personnel and resources in fewer than 48 hours to access damage, engineer,
install, remove, relocate, and reconstitute C4 systems. The flight is capable of
performing engineering technical solutions, project package development, rapid, accurate
and cost effective resolutions to specific customer requirements. Some of the services
this flight is capable of providing include antenna, narrow and wideband radio, satellite,
copper and fiber optics cable, local, wide and metropolitan area networks, Air Traffic
Control radar systems, meteorological equipment, and secure voice and data transmission
systems. The flexibility and ability of the flight to tailor teams of experienced
Communications-Electronics personnel to each unique mission enables RRF to rapidly
meet customer demands.
The flight is currently tasked to provide seventeen (17) different Unit Type Code
(UTC) teams for wartime missions as shown in Table 4. The flight consists of one (1)
officer and one hundred and twenty three (123) enlisted personnel including twenty four
(24) certified team chiefs. There are seven (7) different Air Force Specialty Codes
(AFSC) among the enlisted personnel.
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Table 4. 738th EIS Wartime Mission Taskings by Unit Type Code (UTC)
UTC
Total
Flight/Section
Description/AFSC
Number
6KQJ1
2
RRFR
Ground Radio (AFSC 2E1X3)
6KQK1
2
RRFR
Secure Communications (AFSC 2E2X1)
6KQE1
2
RRFR
Satellite Communications
(SATCOM)/Wideband (AFSC 2E1X1)
6KQG1
2
RRFR
METNAV (AFSC 2E1X2)
6KQF1
2
RRFR
RADAR (AFSC 2E0X1)
6KQLA
2
RRFR
Global Network Enhancement Team
(GNET)
6KQC1
3
RRFC
Cable (AFSC 2E6X2)
6KQB1
2
RRFC
Antenna (AFSC 2E6X2)
6KQV1
3
EEEP
Initial Communications (AFSC 3C0X1)
6KQA1
2
EEEP
Radio Direction Finding
6KQLA
2
EEEP
Global Network Enhancement Team
(GNET)
Source: (Baca, 2004b)

The team chief is considered the workhorse of the flight and arguably of the entire
squadron. Team chiefs are highly skilled installers that have the necessary
administrative, supervisory, managerial, and technical skills required for their specific
profession or AFSC. Individuals must undergo an intensive nomination process, attend
numerous management and technical training courses, and receive special evaluations in
order to achieve, and maintain, the status of team chief. The team chief is the most
knowledgeable, and most valuable, military professional the squadron has.
Specialized Engineering Flight (EEE)
The Specialized Engineering Flight provides worldwide C4 engineering, testing,
and analysis services to Air Force and DOD organizations, other government agencies,
and allied foreign governments. This flight has three sections as graphically indicated in
Figure 4: Electromagnetics (EEEM), Telecommunications (EEET), and Project
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Engineering (EEEP). The members of this flight are capable of providing engineering
expertise in such areas as fiber optics, electromagnetic radiation hazards, microwave
system testing, electromagnetic interference reduction, electromagnetic compatibility,
circuit testing and analysis, antenna system measurement and alignment, high altitude
electromagnetic-pulse verification, local area networks performance testing, and
grounding and lightning protection. The project engineering element provides
engineering support for C4 projects in which RRF will install.
This flight consists of forty five (45) personnel. Twenty five (25) are civilian
government employees all of which are assigned to EEET and EEEM. Project
engineering (EEEP) consists of twenty (20) military officers. Twelve (12) of these
officers are Aerospace Communications and Information Expertise (ACE) lieutenants
serving only a 2-year tour.
The ACE program was established to provide a common operational foundation
for new communications and information officers…the program assigns new
accessions to operational units for their initial tour of duty to help ensure that
accessions have a thorough grounding in the operational aspects of the career field
(Donahue, 2004).

Of the 20 officers in project engineering, 7 engineers are tasked to support 7
UTCs for wartime missions as shown previously in Table 4.
Mission Support Flight (MSF)
The mission support flight provides in-garrison and deployment support for the
Rapid Response Flight and Specialized Engineering Flight. This flight is also further
broken down into two sections: Operations (MSFO) and Logistics (MSFL) as
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graphically indicated in Figure 4. Together these flights support the overall mission of
the squadron by providing the project management, equipment, vehicles, training and
monetary resources essential to ensure combat capability and quick response teams are
equipped and ready to deploy.
Operations (MSFO) is the unit central point for interfacing with customers,
coordinating project engineering and installation, managing projects, monitoring and
reporting project status, and providing technical and team chief quality assurance
evaluations. It also maintains a large technical library and is home to the Air National
Guard liaison officer and NCO. They are the unit's 24-hour focal point for any
contingency or routine engineering/installation requirements and provide the workload
for actual real worldwide training to all installation personnel including installation work
being performed by advised Air National Guard (ANG) units. MSFO has five (5)
personnel assigned, one (1) government civilian employee and four (4) military senior
noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
Logistics (MSFL) manages and supervises in-garrison and deployment support
requirements and has five elements: Standard Installation Practices Training Element,
Readiness Element, Materiel Control Element, Information Technology Element, and
Vehicle Operations Element. MSFL has twenty (20) personnel assigned, including three
(3) civilian government employees and seventeen (17) military personnel.
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Assessing the Framework
Each step will be further broken down into the prospective Key Factors Affecting
Decision Process contained within that step. Upon completion of the analysis of the data
specific to the case each step will be assessed on its usability in the context of the study.
Step 1: Analyze Corporate Strategic Objectives
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Corporate Knowledge Vision and Strategy
The 738th EIS has no established knowledge vision or knowledge strategy.
Nobody interviewed had any understanding of a knowledge strategy. One interviewee
stated that the closest thing to a knowledge strategy that he knew of was the Engineering
Installation (EI) Strategic Plan which discusses training requirements but that was the
extent of it.
Corporate Strategic Objectives
The strategic objective of the 738th is to fulfill permanent installation
requirements of integrated C4 systems and services during war, preparations for war, and
peace. The aim of peacetime engineering and installation is to prepare the unit's
personnel for war. A Total Force Group (TFG) meets to distribute upcoming projects
between the 738th and 19 National Guard EI units. Typically, projects are selected based
upon training deficiencies identified by squadron senior management. In the past few
years the 738th EIS has received direct communications from potential or repeat
customers based upon their reputation for providing an invaluable service with
outstanding quality and a cost savings over civilian contractors. For example, if the
738th has some personnel that need additional training in laying and terminating fiber
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optic cabling, they would select a project at a base that was proposing the installation of
fiber optic cable.
Another strategic objective the squadron provides is through Specialized
Engineering and includes services such as fiber optics, electromagnetic radiation hazards,
microwave system testing, electromagnetic interference reduction, electromagnetic
compatibility, circuit testing and analysis, antenna system measurement and alignment,
high altitude electromagnetic-pulse verification, local area networks performance testing,
and grounding and lightning protection. These services, too, are offered during both
peacetime and war and typically are performed by civilian engineers.
Future Knowledge Requirements
The future knowledge requirements of the squadron can be classified as extremely
high and placed into two categories, future technologies and experienced personnel. Not
surprisingly, there is a need for the squadron to be proficient in the most current C4
systems available to the DoD and government agencies. Currently, however, none of
those interviewed could think of a technology that they are incapable of installing, based
upon recent and past customer requests. The commander did feel, however, that there
was a lack of enlisted expertise specifically in the 3C2XX AFSC (Tech Controllers)
career field. Currently no airman with this AFSC are assigned to the 738th and numerous
Tech Control Facility (TCF) projects are currently underway in the United Air Forces in
Europe (USAFE); for these the 738th relies heavily on the expertise of the civilian
engineers in EEE. There is a clear understanding by those interviewed that the 738th EIS
must always be at the "top of its game" because they are the only Air Force active duty
E&I unit available.
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The fact that the 738th is the only active EI unit doesn't shield them from
downsizing and hurts them even more when personnel are moved or lost due to
permanent change of station (PCS), separation, or retirement. Given that there are no
"sister EI units" from which to receive manning, the unique requirements of EI personnel
requires a great deal of training.
Some sections have a higher turnover rate than others. For example, the Project
Engineering section has 20 military officers, 12 of these are ACE lieutenants fulfilling
only a 2-year assignment. The other 8 officers, at best, will fulfill only 3-year
assignments. No other long-term continuity exists within this section, as soon as the
project engineers are comfortable with doing their jobs they PCS. One project engineer
stated:
"It takes a long time to get 'up to speed' with things and by the time you finally get
the hang of it and start doing more projects and becoming more knowledgeable
you gotta [sic] go…you don't really get the chance to become as knowledgeable
as the team chief or civilian engineers…you're always scrambling around asking
questions trying to figure out what the hell is going on."

One of the civilians stated with a sense of frustration that project engineering is
always in a "constant state of train the trainer with trainees." A typical installer or
experienced team chief can expect to be deployed or away from home station performing
temporary duty (TDY) installing C4 systems approximately 200 days per year. With
such a high operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) one might expect many of the younger
personnel to look for alternate work centers or assignments; however, the flight
commanders say the opposite is true and personnel regularly request additional work and
TDYs.
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Currently there are no measures to ensure continuity for personnel leaving the
squadron. When they depart they take years of training and experience with them, and
the squadron must start the training process over again with their replacement.
During recent deployments to both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom the 738th performed its mission in a wartime environment although one team
chief felt that "stateside installs will not get you ramped up for what we encountered [in
Iraq]." The same team chief stated that one area that seemed to be overlooked was the
team chiefs in certain career fields get "stove piped" into certain installs:
"because of [our] knowledge background [within our] AFSC we don't cross utilize
[ourselves] as we should, some of the older team chiefs are cross-utilized to gain
broad knowledge of the combined [cable/antenna] career field."

Current & Future Information Requirements
Of those interviewed, all seemed to agree that the most information intensive
process of the 738th EIS was that of Project Engineering. For the most part, projects are
engineered by the least experienced personnel in the squadron with little or no oversight.
The project engineers rely heavily on the information and knowledge of the experienced
team chiefs and installers to ensure they draft the project support agreement (PSA)
correctly, order the correct parts and materials, write the correct installation procedures
according to numerous military instructions and federal standards, update base
communications infrastructure drawings, etc..
Often, when the project engineer needs the team chief most, the team chief
assigned to the site survey team is gone to another installation. One project engineer
stated his frustration, "when you get back [from the site survey] to try to write the PSA or
54

[project] package [the team chief is] already off on the next job and it's tough to get hold
of them to get that knowledge."
One senior civilian suggested a reason for this was that at the 738th "the guys that
really know their stuff, we work the hell out of." The most knowledgeable team chiefs
are most often away from the unit leaving the least knowledgeable to assist the project
engineers. The engineering of some projects may extend numerous years and may
include many different project engineers and team chiefs. With most of the team chiefs
being TDY in excess of 200 days a year, the absence of this critical experience can lead
to serious deficiencies with the project.
One project, a copper cable installation at Scott AFB, IL, was engineered over a
lengthy period. It initially began in 1998 but due to budget constraints and other issues
the project was on and off until the final engineered project in 2003. During this time it
may have had five different project engineers and an equal number of team chiefs
assigned to it. During the installation in 2004, major material deficiencies were found
throughout the project and the final tally, in monetary figures, wasn't available for this
writing but was in excess of $30,000. The project had simply passed through too many
hands with little or no continuity.
Information needs seem to be higher in-garrison and not while installation teams
are TDY or deployed. Deployed installation teams travel with the detailed project
package, laptops which include a Team Chief's Handbook detailing specific installation
practices and procedures and a complete Standard Installation Practices Technical Orders
(SIPTOs). Very seldom is there a time when a deployed team has to "reach back" to the
squadron for assistance for the project they're currently working. The team chief may
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have to check back with the squadron to assist a project engineer with a new project still
being engineered.
Specialized Engineering has the need for great amounts of information prior to
deploying. As stated earlier, they are responsible for numerous tasks to include
engineering expertise in such areas as fiber optics, electromagnetic radiation hazards,
microwave system testing, electromagnetic interference reduction, electromagnetic
compatibility, circuit testing and analysis, antenna system measurement and alignment,
high altitude electromagnetic-pulse verification, local area networks performance testing,
and grounding and lightning protection.
Quite often testing is done on circuits or systems installed by the 738th and it's
extremely beneficial to have detailed tasks performed by the installation teams; however,
these detailed tasks don't exist. If a civilian engineer wants to know who installed Cable
12 at Scott AFB, for example, the civilian engineer either needs to know first hand which
team chief installed it and approach them directly, or they have to try to just figure it out
once he arrives on site.
Opportunities to Capitalize on Organizational Knowledge
When questions based upon this topic were presented to each of the interviewees
a central theme became apparent--they needed continuity within the sections. Other
opportunities to include measures to share networked files across work centers, filing and
sharing lessons learned, a well-defined and structured mentorship program also presented
themselves, but continuity seemed to be the hot topic. All agreed continuity was
definitely needed within Project Engineering, especially since a majority of the officers in
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this section were ACE lieutenants. Measures are needed to prevent the constant
"outflow" of organizational knowledge from this vital section.
Current Organizational Knowledge
The core knowledge available to allow the 738th to complete its mission rests
with experienced and knowledgeable team chiefs, installers, and specialized engineers.
Project engineers and the specialized engineers need the tacit knowledge of the team
chief and installers to assist them in performance of their duties.
Captured or Known
The known core organizational knowledge resides with the heads of the
experienced team chiefs and installers. Other sources of captured knowledge include
stored project support agreements (PSAs), project packages, SIPTOs, and the Team
Chief's Handbook. Specialized engineering also files reports after completion of special
projects, but these reports reside on one individual's secluded computer. When
interviewees were asked about their first source of help when they struggled with an issue
the answer almost always involved a co-worker.
Uncaptured or Unknown
Uncaptured knowledge includes that tacit knowledge within the heads of team
chiefs and installers. Specialized engineers hold a wealth of knowledge unknown to most
of the squadron. The reason this knowledge is unknown is primarily because most
squadron members don't even know what the civilian engineers do. Another source of
uncaptured and unknown knowledge is lessons learned from the field. There has never
been a project that went through the entire project engineering process with no errors.
There is no formal feedback process to address lessons learned when the installation team
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returns to the squadron; if it isn't heard through rumor how badly a package was
engineered the project engineer has no way of knowing how to improve his/her product.
It only seems fitting that if one is to rely on the least experienced organizational member
to engineer the projects the organization installs then a lessons learned process would be
beneficial.
Other unknowns include future technologies that may pose potential knowledge
gaps in the organization. The organization must constantly look ahead to future systems
to include biometrics and future network centric warfare technologies.
Knowledge Required to Achieve Strategic Objectives
Currently, the critical knowledge required to achieve strategic objectives lies with
experienced and well trained team chiefs, installers, and specialized engineers. To ensure
strategic objectives are met in the future requires the establishment of a long-term
knowledge base throughout the organization but especially within Project Engineering.
Key Subtask: Identify Knowledge and Information Issue Related to Strategic
Objectives
The 738th EIS has no knowledge strategy which is recommended as an early step
in any knowledge management effort (Holsapple & Joshi, 2002; M. Zack, 1999). Step 1
of the framework helped with identifying potential "gaps" within the knowledge
resources available to squadron personnel. Knowledge management could provide the
738th EIS a long-term strategic advantage. Currently there is no effort to ensure that the
people of the squadron that require access to knowledge resources the most have it.
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Step 2: Identify Potential KM Opportunities & Limitations
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Senior Leadership Interest & Project Sponsorship
One could conclude that senior leadership has an interest in the implementation of
knowledge management since they agreed to sponsor this research. A senior civilian at
the site agreed that knowledge management practices such as lessons learned and sharing
of organization knowledge would be beneficial. The commander agreed that KM is a
valuable initiative to implement, but recognized that with the upcoming realignment
under ACC he "wouldn't support a KM effort until the 'dust' settles. [Too] much change
[too] quickly." Military and civilian leaders at the squadron agreed that the overall
"knowledge base is getting worse…team chiefs are retiring and there are no longer 'sister'
units to [which] team chiefs can rotate back in and keep up experience level[s]."
Analyze Current Business Processes
One of the main processes the squadron performs is the project engineering
process shown in Figure 5. The purpose of this process is the development of
engineering installation (EI) project packages used to install, remove, relocate, reinstall,
and retrofit communications and information systems (Haley, 2001).
Once training needs of the squadron are determined a project is selected from the
TFG, or through direct customer contact, and the 738th assigns a project manager (PM)
who will manage the project throughout its duration. An engineer is then assigned to
engineer the package. AFMCI 33-104 states the criteria for assigning an engineer as:
Project complexity and availability of personnel resources usually determine
whether the project is assigned to a degreed engineer, team chief, or enlisted
engineer for project package development (Haley, 2001).
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The majority of the projects engineered at the 738th are assigned to the military
officer project engineers in EEEP. If a site survey is needed, a team chief and additional
installer(s) will travel with the officer to the customers site in order to determine specifics
for the project. A project support agreement (PSA), basically a contract between the
738th and the customer, will be completed based upon the site survey data.
Upon completion of the site survey, and after receiving PSA concurrence from
customer, the engineer will develop the project package. This package, the complexity
and detail of which is directly proportional to project complexity, will include a List of
Materials (LOM), installation or removal instructions, testing instructions, drawings, and
other pertinent information applicable to the project. Ideally this will be developed with
the direct involvement of the team chief that assisted with the site survey.
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Figure 5. Project Engineering Process
(Haley, 2001)
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The completed project package is then submitted for team chief review. An
experienced team chief, other than the one that was originally assigned to the site survey
team, will be assigned to review the package. This thorough review will ensure the
correct materials in the correct quantities are ordered, all instructions are clear and
complete, and all drawings have been annotated properly. All discrepancies are
annotated and returned to the project engineer for correction. Once the package is
suitable to all parties, including the customer, the finalized package is then scheduled for
installation. If any changes need to be made to the package while it is being installed
either the on site team chief or the customer submits an Engineering Change
Request/Authorization (ECRA) to the project engineer.
Current Organizational Structure
As depicted in Figure 4 the squadron is organized into three (3) flights-- Rapid
Response Flight, Specialized Engineering Flight, and Mission Support Flight. These are
all detailed in the Introduction section of this chapter.
The current organization doesn't allow for easy access to experienced team chiefs
or civilian engineers by the project engineers. They are physically separated and there
appears to be a certain intimidation factor which prevents the young officer engineers
from enlisting the help of the team chiefs and civilians. Most squadron personnel don't
even know what experience the civilians have to offer to the squadron.
Existing IT Infrastructure
Currently all servers owned by the 738th are physically stored and maintained by
the base communications squadron. The only hardware located at the squadron consists
of the individual workstations and a 100 megabyte per second (MBPS) Entrasys switch
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that is connected via single mode fiber backbone to the base network located 5 miles
away. Services provided include email, file, and Internet. The squadron also has laptop
computers that are available for TDY personnel. Currently the squadron has no virtual
private network (VPN) capability but is pressing to get it as expressed by the IT manager,
"we want VPN connectivity desperately so our folks in the field can get access to the
drawings and other digital files required in meeting our mission." They do, however,
have remote access to their email accounts while TDY. The Mission Support Flight
(MSF) at the squadron performs administrative management all 738th EIS electronic files
to include permissions and structure of the files.
MSF states that the permissions and rules for who has access to each flight's files
(READ/READ & WRITE) is the responsibility of each section chief; however,
department heads of each section report otherwise. There are problems with members of
the same flight having access to the files of other elements within that flight. For
example Specialized Engineering has three elements, EEEP, EEET, and EEEM.
Members of EEET can't access and use information from EEEP or EEEM. Also, there
are problems with access and file sharing between flights. Those interviewed felt
strongly that all information should be available to all members, at least at the READ
level unless classified or protected by the Privacy Act.
The 738th has an internal intranet that has many useful links for travel related
issues, internal TDY planning forms, links to informative AF sites, etc. Other than for
preparing for TDYs, of those interviewed none found the Intranet site useful for the
performance of their duties. The commander, in line with the desire of the Air Force,
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made a recent effort to ensure all squadron members had an active Air Force Portal
account.
The squadron has an annual IT budget of "roughly $100K" and according to the
IT manager there has never been an issue of not being able to upgrade or add to existing
infrastructure because of lack of funds.
Resources Available to Apply to KM Efforts
Through discussions with many squadron personnel the main resources needed to
support any KM effort would be people. Most felt that a majority of the resources
needed are already on hand. A slight reorganization would also be required, possibly
establishing some long-term civilian positions to provide a knowledge base within each
section. This may require the addition of a number of civilian positions, which one
interviewee stated "when the 738th was established at Keesler AFB with 9 military
officers [project engineers] I thought that was a mistake…we had hundreds of project
engineers that were civilians; we needed a mix of officers and civilians for continuity."
He also felt positions could easily be procured from the 38th at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma
by submitting a simple letter. It is believed the reason this hasn't been accomplished to
date is because recent commanders have been concerned about losing military positions.
(The commander later disclosed that he had, in fact, "sent the letter forward and that there
was no link with losing military positions.")
The commander stated that he, in fact, had "asked that the 5 civilian positions
taken from us (AFMC downward directed across the board cut) prior to my arrival be
returned. I did in fact get a couple of these positions back after much negotiation." He
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also included that another eleven (11) military positions are to be added in the summer of
2005.
Critical knowledge resources reside in past project packages and PSAs. Many
completed project packages are archived in digital format on common project
engineering hard drives. The computer resources available to the unit are more than
adequate; however, policy on sharing the access to files is a problem across flights. One
interviewee stated his frustration about the permissions for access as "it's your own
library that you don't have access to" and felt that "anything that can be shared should be
shared."
Budget Constraints
Budget constraints don't seem to be a problem for the 738th. For the fiscal year
2004, the total funding for the 738th was $4,572,700. However, $2,888,596 of theses
funds consisted of selective cost reimbursement provided by customers. Out of those
interviewed, none felt the budget could hamper any KM initiative, they all seemed very
proud of the enormous budget. Some seemed concerned about the reorganization of the
squadron under a new major command (MAJCOM). The 738th is supposed to transfer
from Air Force Material Command (AFMC) to Air Combat Command (ACC). Although
it's not clear as to when this reorganization is supposed to happen (the commander stated
January 2005) or how it would affect the squadron, many felt money could be sparse,
after the first couple of years, as E&I competes under ACC with other warfighters.
Potential to Create a Learning Organization
A learning organization is "an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and
transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and
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insights (Garvin, 1993)." The squadron has the potential to create a "Knowledge
Library" with its existing infrastructure that would provide great value to the members of
the organization and contribute directly to the project engineering process. This may be
accomplished by relaxing some permission rules to facilitate information sharing,
consolidating templates of project support agreements and packages, and creating an
organizational knowledge map to assist in identifying tacit knowledge bases within the
squadron.
The major hurdle to overcome to become a learning organization is that of
behavior. One will have to make a concerted effort to change the behavior of each
person to gain the benefits of KM. In speaking with squadron personnel the researcher
believes this shouldn't be a difficult task for the 738th. Their motto is "With Pride
Worldwide" and they appear to believe they are the best at what they do. They take great
pride is being the only active EI unit and brag about being, by far, the best EI when
compared to the nineteen (19) Air National Guard EI units.
Value of Tacit and Explicit Organizational Knowledge
The consensus from those interviewed was that squadron personnel value the tacit
knowledge of some of the more experienced team chiefs and installers more than any
other knowledge source that has been created by squadron personnel. Project engineers
and civilians stated that they seek out other knowledgeable peers or team chiefs before
browsing through previous PSAs, project packages, and reports.
The explicit knowledge that is available to personnel, with exception of the
SIPTOs and other technical orders and manuals, isn't found to be as useful to those that
would use it most. The main reason for this is believed to be that many of the sources
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aren't trusted. Unless the author of the source is known, and known to be a trusted,
knowledgeable source, most would rather start from scratch than take the chance of reusing a template that is incorrect.
Availability and Usability of Tacit and Explicit Organizational
Knowledge
Tacit knowledge, from team chiefs and installers, isn't always readily available for
use. As mentioned earlier, every project engineer interviewed stated frustration with
trying to locate team chiefs at critical times in project package development. Sometimes
projects get bogged down for weeks at a time because other team chiefs are reluctant to
assist since they weren't the one that performed the site survey or aren't sure what the
"thought process was of the original team chief". One team chief recommended a
centrally located project folder that contained standardized notes from the original site
survey, drawings, and pictures so any other team chief could pick it up and know what
the other was thinking. Currently there is no policy or rule to prevent a team chief from
going TDY while a package that they have an active participant role in is being
developed.
An extremely knowledgeable civilian staff exists in the specialized engineering
flight but is seldom, if ever, used. Most squadron personnel fail to realize the benefit this
flight provides to the squadron. Their expertise is crucial in almost every package
developed and especially in the process of developing the PSA. The commander spoke
highly of the civilians filling in the gap of not having 3C2s (Tech Controllers) assigned to
the squadron for the Tech Control Facility projects currently underway in USAFE.

67

A majority of the PSAs and project packages developed by the project engineers
are available for use on a central squadron server. However, there is no means to know if
the PSAs or packages contain errors. So if an engineer is to re-use the PSA or project
package, which is common practice, they run the risk of making repeat mistakes.
Other forms of explicit knowledge, to include SIPTOs, technical orders (TOs),
team chief guides, standard PSA template, and TDY travel data are available via 738th
intranet or through their in-house technical library. Computer file permissions currently
prevent the use, across flights, of stored information. Quality assurance (QA) reports,
when performed, aren't made available to the entire unit for review, they are routed
through senior management channels only. These QA reports are the closest thing the
738th has to a lessons learned/best practices program.
Potential Loss of Critical Organizational Knowledge
There are numerous instances where the loss of critical knowledge is currently
happening. One major source, identified by all that were interviewed, is the frequency at
which project engineers are transferred in and out of the squadron. Another is the recent
retirement, upcoming retirement, PCS, or PCA of a number of experienced team chiefs as
identified in Table 5. The loss of civilian positions is always a concern, especially with
down-sizing and outsourcing; however, none of those interviewed felt it was an
immediate threat. Retirement of high- level or experienced civilians is also a concern.
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Section
RRFR
RRFC
RRFR
RRFC
RRFR
RRFC

Table 5. Potential Loss of Team Chiefs
Last Calendar Year (2003)
PCS/PCA
Retire
Eligible to Retire
1
1
0
0
4
0
This Calendar Year (2004)
0
0
3
1
1
6
Next Calendar Year (2005)
4
0
4
2
0
8

Note: RRFR currently has nine (9) team chiefs; RRFC has fifteen (15)

The project engineering process is well documented; however it isn't well known
by many of the engineers. The explicit knowledge within the PSAs and project packages
could stand to be more actively captured and managed. It is recommended that a
methodology for archiving projects for both short- and long-term use be devised and
practiced. Other methods could also be established to ensure these archived projects are
trusted by future users.
Key Subtask: Identify and Analyze Potential KM Opportunities and Limitations
The Key Subtask of this step is to identify and analyze potential KM opportunities
and limitations. Based upon the findings reported above, numerous KM opportunities
seem evident to the researcher. It must be emphasized, however, that before any of these
are considered it is recommended that the 738th devise a knowledge strategy and then
ensure any KM opportunity they consider is in support of this strategy.
First, there is an opportunity for the squadron to recognize, and manage, its core
knowledge as a resource and asset. When resources were discussed with key members
the typical answers included people, money, and equipment. Currently the commander's
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briefing contains slides to discuss each flight, the people within the flight, UTCs
supported, the budget, and the vehicle fleet of the squadron. There appears to the
researcher to be a lack of understanding that knowledge is a chief key resource and that
the squadron could benefit from affording it the same attention as other resources.
Second, there is clearly an opportunity for the squadron to create a knowledge
repository for use by all squadron members. Many instances exist in which the squadron
can codify, or document, key knowledge needed for the core process of the squadron.
This repository may well include any and all knowledge that can be placed into a
document format to include standard templates for project packages and project support
agreements for the different commodities, detailed instructions on tasks performed,
technical documents, standard installation practices technical orders, lessons learned, trip
reports, etc..
Third, it is recommended that the squadron provide measures to improve
knowledge access to those who need it most. Whether this knowledge is captured in
documents, reports, project packages, technical orders, technical publications, etc., or
stored within experience personnel's heads, this knowledge must be made available, and
accessible to all squadron members no matter the format. It is understood that
classification and Privacy Act information may hinder this somewhat, but to the extent
possible it is recommended to share what can be shared.
Limitations to any of these opportunities lie mainly with cultural change,
education, and squadron acceptance. Realizing and managing knowledge as a resource
isn't a common practice so it is advised that the squadron be educated so that they
understand the importance of knowledge. The squadron then must accept this
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understanding and incorporate it into its daily operations. This will be vital to the
acceptance of creating and maintaining the knowledge repository.
Step 2b: Identify and Analyze Cultural Aspects of the Organization
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Level of Communication
It has been determined that increased levels of communication in an organization
contribute greatly to the success of implementing a KM initiative (Phillips, 2003). This is
one area that the 738th needs to address prior to implementing any initiative. Many
believe the communication level is low between flights and low within flights/elements.
However, the commander feels the squadron, as a whole, communicates "very
well." He continues "the current structure and mixture of military and civilians has
worked out well. [The] Operations [Flight] (MSFO) is the glue that holds projects
together." He concedes, however, that "personalities do have a big impact [on
communication]."
Most project engineers feel comfortable asking questions within their element
because it is "more comfortable to reach out to one of your peers" than outside because
they don't want officers to be perceived as being poor communicators:
"It may look to others that we don't communicate well up here [in project
engineering] if we're looking elsewhere for knowledge…they [enlisted team
chiefs] feel they shouldn't have to continue to fix our problems when somebody
else has asked the same thing."
The civilians of the squadron seem to be the forgotten group. One stated that he
felt they were "useful, but the military people don't think we're useful [and] the
commander doesn't even know what we do." Another even suggested the commander
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"was uncomfortable working with civilians [and that] people don't know the potential of
civilians." He continues that "with the average civilian time in the squadron being
between 15 and 20 years [not knowing their potential] cuts the knowledge potential of the
organization significantly." However, this wasn't the feeling the researcher received from
the commander, he specifically stated that he placed "extreme value" on the assigned
"professional, skilled, and talented civil[ian] engineers. [Without] them we could not
accomplish the EEE mission."
Many feel the communications within individual flights is low because
information isn't shared internally. A civilian employee stated that he hadn't attended a
morning meeting to discuss topics "in many years." The lack of communication within
project engineering is illustrated in a statement by one project engineer:
"[we] don't talk about problems…one downside is there's no way to know what's
going on with everybody else, we're all kind of focused on our own projects not
really thinking about anything else."
Lack of communication also exists in selecting project engineers for projects,
"they don't look at people's strong points…their past experience" stated one project
engineer who recently PCSd from a combat communications unit. This engineer had
recently been assigned to engineer a radio project even though his combat comm.
experience was in computer networking.
One positive factor about the communication process at the 738th is that all seem
to have the same common goal in mind when dealing with projects--to provide the best
service to their customers. Most are comfortable with the jargon and particulars of many
of the processes and things common to the squadron; however, the understanding and
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comfort is diminished when the communication involves the technical aspects to specific
projects.
Encouraging Team Orientation
Over the past twenty (20) years the observed trend has been that "people seemed
to be separating more and becoming less cohesive," stated one squadron member. The
civilians definitely don't feel part of the team. They feel they aren't trusted to supervise
flights or elements, and they feel nobody in the squadron knows, or cares, about what
they do. During many of the interviews the interviewees spoke of "us" or "them" or
"them over there" which led the researcher to believe that many feel less part of a whole
team and instead as an entity or somebody that supports, or is supported by, somebody
else.
Most feel more of a team when in a deployed environment; one team chief spoke
proudly about how his deployed team "was pretty loaded" with dedicated and
knowledgeable personnel. It is believed that this greater sense of team orientation arises
when the team is focused on achieving common goals. When deployed, or TDY on an
installation, the team is focused on the task at hand and little else. The quicker the
installation is completed, the quicker one gets to go home or move on to a "better"
installation. The war on terrorism has given a great deal of visibility to EI; team cohesion
seems to be prevalent with most squadron members because they all have a great deal of
pride in what they do.
There doesn't seem to be the same team concept in-garrison. The project
engineering process seems to be well structured as to who is to perform what and when
and there doesn't appear to be any collaboration or overlap. The lack of team orientation
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in-garrison exists because only one person is focused on the goal of engineering the
project. Team chiefs and installers don't have the same ownership and motivation to
complete a good project package; they leave it up to the engineer.
Trust Among Employees
On the military side one would have to say that the trust between enlisted and
officers is fairly high. The conclusion is based on the fact that the officer engineers rely
heavily on the advice and counsel of the enlisted team chiefs and installers in order to
engineer projects. Many of the engineers don't have the experience, or time, to question
the suggestions and advice provided them by the enlisted personnel. One team chief put
this bluntly when he stated, "we have the experience and they [the engineers] are held
liable for it…if it doesn't work it's on [the project engineer]."
Trust between enlisted installers and team chiefs seem to be a little less concrete.
One team chief stated that he had little faith in some of the other team chiefs:
"you come in here as a tech[nical] sergeant or master sergeant doesn't mean you
have the knowledge for E&I…some tech sergeants they're pushing through I don't
feel have the knowledge to do it; don't have the background to do it."

It seems doubtful that one could trust one's peer's abilities if they fail to respect
the reason they are a team chief. The researcher has reason to believe that the installers
pick up these "vibes" from the other team chiefs as well, thereby undermining the
credibility of some team chiefs.
The civilians, on the other hand, feel they aren't trusted. This again comes from
the fact that the commander fails to put them in positions of leadership/management.
One squadron member stated they perceived "a civilian/commander barrier…in which
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[his] advice isn't worth much." Also noteworthy was the perception some squadron
members had that the commander would send an enlisted member to represent the
squadron at crisis action team (CAT) meetings, conferences, and commander's calls,
before he sent any of the civilians. Needless to say, the civilians feel no real value in
what they contribute to the squadron, which can have a serious effect on trust.
The commander clearly recognizes that "it's a cultural thing." It's not that he
doesn't trust civilians instead he bases his attitude towards civilians on the decisiveness of
the military officers, "the biggest difference I see between the civilian chief and flight
commander is that the officer will normally make the tough decisions while the civilian
will take it to the squadron commander." The commander is also fundamentally a strong
believer in placing military in charge for their professional development and the ability to
deploy them in times of crisis, "when the balloon goes up the military goes [where] they
are told; you have to ask most civilians."
The commander seemed receptive about the prospect of placing civilians in each
section or flight for a long-term knowledge base, "the only way I would do this is by
rewriting the job description and making them mission essential/deployable. If they are
going to be in a flight or section that deploys…they will deploy."
Conflict Between Employees
Conflict between military personnel seems to be inherent to military culture.
Since most military performance reports, awards, and decorations are based upon
individual performance, it seems a certain level of conflict will always be present. Other
than this competitive conflict no serious conflict seemed to exist between squadron
members.
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One area of interest was that of project engineering. The officers assigned to this
section are mostly new to the Air Force and new to the communications and information
career field. There seems to be a level of animosity between some of the enlisted team
chiefs and installers and the officer project engineers. The officers rely on the knowledge
of the enlisted personnel to perform their duties, but feel intimidated to have to ask for
help. On the other hand, some of the enlisted are unwilling to help because they are
"cocky" as one civilian stated, and feel engineering or communications officers "should
know what they are doing." They leave the officers to make mistakes on their own.
One final area of contention was between civilian employees and their perceived
uselessness in the eyes of military personnel and the squadron commander. Once again
the civilians feel segregated from the rest of the squadron and feel what they do for the
squadron isn't appreciated or understood.
Leadership Support for KM
The commander and a high level civilian both seemed extremely interested in
implementing KM to improve business process within the unit. The researcher
concluded this leadership would continue based upon the impressions of these key
members.
Learning Initiative
There really isn't anything that could be considered a learning initiative currently
at the 738th. Lessons learned aren't captured and shared, problems within sections seem
to be handled haphazardly, and there doesn't seem to be a high priority placed on sending
new engineers, installers, or team chiefs TDY on project installations to gain knowledge
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required for their perspective duty. Many agreed that the best opportunity for learning
occurred during project installations.
The 738th, however, does seem to make training a priority. They have an inhouse training department that focuses mainly on standard installation practices and, as a
core to their business, they select projects based upon squadron identified training
deficiencies. One weakness in training seems to be that of properly training officer
engineers for their wartime UTC taskings. For example, it was pointed out that a few
military officer project engineers assigned to a radio UTC are currently engineering
projects that aren't meaningful in providing training, and knowledge required for the
wartime radio UTC and no other training is provided to them.
Adaptability to New Systems and Ideas
For the business this EI unit is in they really have no choice but to be able to adapt
to new systems and ideas. There is no doubt the 738th is adapting to new systems and
ideas. Recently in Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom, a deployed EI team
had to rely on robotic trenchers to dig the trenches needed to bury fiber optic and copper
cabling for base communications infrastructure. Hazardous explosive ordnance buried
beneath the ground made the use of a conventional trencher a risk not worth taking.
One highly respected team chief is apparently an advocate of trying new things on
installations; when he talked about doing new things on installations he stated "if it
works, fine, if it doesn't say 'this is why it didn't' not 'this is the way we've done it for the
past ten years.'" The same team chief recommended to his fellow team chiefs and
installers to be "hands off" when training new airmen. When watching an airman
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perform something unique, "nine times out of ten," he stated "it'll work and you'll learn
something...I've learned more things from watching airman train."
Tolerance for Risk
There seems to be a high tolerance for risk within the squadron. To have the least
experienced squadron personnel engineering multi-million dollar projects is clearly a
risk. Since no projects have ever made it through the process with no mistakes, and some
of those mistakes can be very expensive (one personally known to be in excess of
$30,000) one would find it hard to argue that the squadron does not have a high
propensity for risk. One good thing about these mistakes is that engineers and team
chiefs aren't ever punished for making them. This is a clear indication that senior
leadership won't punish those who are either learning or trying innovative things. There
seems to be an accepted level of tolerance for well-intentioned errors.
One could argue that the commander sees placing civilians in charge of sections
or flights as a risk. Many civilians believe the commander structured the squadron into
the three flights, with either a captain or major in charge of each flight, because the he
doesn't feel comfortable with the civilians' capacity to make decisions. Of the civilians
interviewed one believed it was structured this way to provide an opportunity to
professionally develop the officers of the squadron which was later confirmed by the
commander. Another had a different perspective, "he's structured it because he doesn't
want civilians in charge, he wants military in charge regardless of experience." That
could be an indication that the commander doesn't want to risk placing a civilian in
charge because of the unique wartime taskings of the squadron.
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Having an Existing Strong & Positive Culture
It seemed that most of the squadron members, except for some of the civilian
employees, had high morale. But without question all are committed to doing their best
at what they do, even if they do feel "ill-prepared". The 738th has a great reputation and
all members seem committed to maintaining that reputation. "We take a lot of pride in
what we do," seemed to be a common response from those interviewed. There's no doubt
this squadron lives up to its motto "With Pride Worldwide," and many commented on the
fact that EIers are a "close knit bunch."
Key Subtask: Identify and Analyze Cultural Aspects of the Organization
A 1998 survey performed by knowledge management advocates found that the
most important condition leading to the success of KM projects was the "knowledgefriendly" culture of the organization (Davenport et al., 1998). This step was excellent in
identifying issues that may not be obvious to the leader of an organization.
Based on what was learned here, the 738th has some issues it may need to address
prior to initiating any KM initiative. However, many of the issues may be eliminated
once an initiative is initiated thereby providing an opportunity for better interaction
between all members of the organization, better camaraderie between team members, and
greater, measurable, organizational productivity, and, most importantly, better decision
making by all.
It may be that many of the issues identified may be caused by the mere frustration
of organizational members having to perform their duties while lacking the knowledge to
do so. Others, specifically team chiefs, are frustrated because they are overworked for
being too knowledgeable and therefore are always traveling. Also, the lack of a strategy
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to best utilize the collective knowledge, in essence providing a "knowledge compass,"
may be the reason some areas and some people are overlooked or not properly managed.
The organization appears not to know what it knows or know what it doesn't know.
While an initial assessment of culture was undertaken, the complexities of the
concept suggest that more time could have been profitably spent in this area. The cultural
issues under investigation in this step take much more data collection, consideration, and
time to study than what was available to this researcher. None the less, the Key Factors
Affecting Decision Process in this step were useful in identifying issues that may have
otherwise been overlooked.
Based upon the interviews conducted and findings of this step, it may be fair to
state that the 738th many not be "knowledge friendly" but rather "knowledge willing."
Most believe they provide some value to the organization and have great pride in
performance of their duties. A KM initiative that gives greater visibility to knowledge
sharing and transfer between members may, in fact, help to create a culture that is more
knowledge friendly.
Step 3: Identify Potential KM Project
As identified in Step 2 three potential opportunities for knowledge management
were identified for the 738th EIS. These include the creation of a knowledge repository,
improving the access to this repository and other knowledge resources, and realizing and
managing knowledge as a resource. This section will outline some specific examples of
projects that may be considered by the 738th for implementation considering the
aforementioned opportunities and organizational culture issues identified. Each potential
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project will be identified individually with its own set of Key Factors Affecting Decision
Process.
Project 1: Creation of 738th Knowledge Library/Repository
One thing that may facilitate sharing is to codify, or put into digital format,
everything that can be. Templates for common types of jobs with examples of how the
package is developed may ease the burden on less knowledgeable squadron members.
Operating instructions, technical orders, technical manuals, standard installation
practices, and project reports may prove beneficial if they were to be all centrally located.
An opportunity exists to implement a lessons learned and business best practices program
that may provide considerable value to the organization. It is recommended that each
package developed by the project engineering team be digitally recorded on a squadron
server that all squadron members have access to. The military officer engineer could be
responsible for ensuring lessons learned are documented and started from the beginning
of the project from the site survey, project package development, installation, and quality
assurance report (if available).
Along with the codified material, create a knowledge map of the organization and
post it within the library to assist in identifying tacit knowledge "repositories." Identify
knowledgeable team chiefs, installers, civilians, and project engineers and post their
background, their specialty, their picture, and a contact number.
Many of these recommendations may be accomplished using knowledge
management initiatives sponsored by the Air Force, specifically Air Force Knowledge
Now website. It's recommended that the 738th EIS take advantage of the Air Force's
Knowledge Management initiative and register a Community of Practice (CoP) for all
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EIers. By doing this the 738th could store its digital knowledge repositories and
knowledge map of squadron personnel with accessibility from the Internet, via the AF
Portal, anywhere at anytime. Within this site, documents could be uploaded, searched by
key words, and accessed by all squadron members. Another major advantage of
implementing a CoP would be that the 738th could link with personnel that have PCSed
by "inviting" them to join thereby allowing for the continued use of their knowledge. Of
the many great features of the site, all members of a CoP would be notified, via email,
when documents were uploaded, updated or removed. Members could participate in a
community-based electronic discussion where questions or comments could be posted
and be open to all squadron members for answers.
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Senior Leadership Interest and Project Sponsorship
Senior support for any KM initiative would be required to give the project
credibility.
Focus of KM Efforts on People and Processes, Not Technology
A knowledge repository would bring people together to work on common goals
while encouraging trust building in each other and the codified knowledge. The primary
purpose of the knowledge library would be to assist in the project engineering process.
The technology provided by the Intranet, local servers, or the Air Force Knowledge Now
website should only be viewed as an enabler for KM. It's important to remember that the
repository would be for the future of the 738th, not just those currently assigned. People
would be the end users of the repository; therefore it's recommended that the squadron
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make an effort to identify what the people would want from the repository, not
necessarily what would be easy or convenient for them.
Tie Potential KM Efforts to Key Business Process
The core business process of the 738th, the project engineering process, would be
the main focus of the knowledge repository. Other processes within the squadron may
also eventually benefit from the knowledge repository and include the project selection
process and team chief review process.
Identify Scope and Desired Outcome of KM Effort
It is recommended that all knowledge requisite to creating project support
agreements (PSAs) and engineering the entire individual project packages, no mater the
commodity, be the scope of the knowledge repository. The desired outcome of the
repository would be centrally located knowledge that is current, trusted, and strengthened
through continued use by all squadron members. Also, it's strongly advised that the
squadron focus on what may be useful to future members of the squadron.
Define Knowledge to be Utilized by KM Effort
Both explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge would be used by this project.
Explicit knowledge would exist in the form of digitized documents or presentations,
while tacit knowledge of all squadron members could be made accessible through the use
of knowledge maps or community-based electronic discussion. Specific knowledge that
could be used under this effort would be that which would be identified through an indepth investigation of the knowledge required to support the project engineering process.

83

Develop Common Taxonomy of Terms
In conducting the interviews for this study it was apparent that most personnel
had a firm understanding of terms commonly used to perform EI duties. However, since
there is a high turnover of officer engineers it is recommended that a taxonomy of terms
be devised and posted within the library. If the Air Force Knowledge Now site were to
be used, a taxonomy of terms would already exist.
Project 2: Improving Knowledge Access
It was never clear in conducting this study why the personnel that were ultimately
responsible for developing the entire project package were the most inexperienced
military officer project engineers. Throughout the project engineering process the
engineers have little or no direct oversight by the more knowledgeable or experienced
team chiefs or installers. The military officers assigned to develop the project packages
have only a fraction of the technical expertise required for many information and
communications systems they are responsible for engineering.
One of the chief complaints of project engineers was that they didn't have access
to knowledgeable team chiefs when they needed it most. One solution to this would be to
create project teams consisting of a military officer engineer, team chief, civilian
engineer, and installer(s). This team could be formed upon selection of the project from
the TFG or customer and would work collectively to complete the PSA and project
package. The team would not be dissolved (no TDYs, unless emergency/UTC tasking)
until package is submitted for review. This team concept would not only decrease the
time it takes for a project to be developed, but it could also allow for mentorship between
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officer/enlisted/civilian which, in itself, is a knowledge management initiative that could
help to professionally develop squadron personnel.
Currently, not all information on the squadrons severs are available to all
members of the squadron. One recommendation would be to ensure permission is
granted for all information unless prohibited by Privacy Act or classification. These
permissions, along with the centrally located knowledge repository, may improve access
and promote more efficient use of the available squadron knowledge.
Accessibility may also be provided through use of long-term civilian "super team
chief" positions in all sections. This could help in the creation of a long-term knowledge
base familiar with all projects and this member would act as a liaison between sections.
These team chiefs would also be able to oversee those less experienced in certain tasks
and also ensure the workload is distributed evenly and appropriately based upon an
employee's background.
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Senior Leadership Interest and Project Sponsorship
Senior support for any KM initiative would be required to give the project
credibility.
Focus of KM Efforts on People and Processes, Not Technology
The project team and "super team chief" concepts would facilitate the
collaboration of squadron personnel to influence the transfer of critical knowledge
needed to engineer projects. There would be little use of technology in this project,
except that which would be used to develop the required documents for the project.
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Team collaboration and mentorship are proven methods of knowledge transfer and
creation.
Tie Potential KM Efforts to Key Business Process
This proposed project would be an effort to achieve the greatest success in the
project engineering process by bringing the right people together at the right time for the
right reason; the project engineering process is the core business process of the 738th
EIS.
Identify Scope and Desired Outcome of KM Effort
The scope of this project would be to bring the requisite knowledge together to
engineer the project package through increased knowledge transfer, knowledge use, and
mentorship between squadron members. The ultimate outcome would be increased
process performance, less mistakes in project packages, better team cohesion, and
knowledge transfer between personnel.
Define Knowledge to be Utilized by KM Effort
The main knowledge used in this proposed project would be tacit knowledge.
Most of what the experienced installers, team chiefs, and civilian engineers bring to the
table would be what's contained within their heads. Assembling a team for a common
goal effectively utilizes personal experience that could be difficult, if not impossible, to
capture otherwise.
Develop Common Taxonomy of Terms
Some new terms that may need to be added to EI terminology could include those
necessary to identify the structure of the project team, team member responsibilities, etc.
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Other taxonomies include those required to assist in the storage, access, and use of
project data on the squadron's network.
Project 3: Recognize and Manage Knowledge as an Asset
Many civilian organizations have been successful in achieving this goal by
treating knowledge like any other asset and presenting it on their balance sheets
(Davenport et al., 1998). Military organizations could begin to achieve similar results by
simply acknowledging the knowledge and experience of their people and where, within
the organization, it resides. Most military commanders pay particular attention to money
distribution throughout an organization, but don't give a second thought to their
knowledge distribution. Money alone won't engineer, install, troubleshoot, or support the
projects as outlined in the squadron's mission. This project could simply provide the
military commander and civilian leaders a new perspective in which to view their
organization.
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Senior Leadership Interest and Project Sponsorship
Senior support for any KM initiative would be required to give the project both
visibility and credibility. A project team assembled to identify the organizations
knowledge may be necessary.
Focus of KM Efforts on People and Processes, Not Technology
Focus on the personnel in the organization that have the experience and
knowledge and where they are located in the organization. The knowledge to identify
would be that which is necessary for project engineering success, from beginning to end.
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Other processes of the squadron could follow; however, the project engineering process
would be the main focus of this effort since it is the 738th's core business.
Tie Potential KM Efforts to Key Business Process
This proposed project would be an effort to achieve the greatest success in the
project engineering process; the project engineering process is the core business process
of the 738th EIS.
Identify Scope and Desired Outcome of KM Effort
The desired scope of this project would be to generate a greater understanding and
organizational acceptance of knowledge as a resource. The desired outcome would be
increased knowledge owner awareness and its management in supporting key business
processes.
Define Knowledge to be Utilized by KM Effort
Knowledge to be used under this project would include all organizational
knowledge, both tacit and explicit. Tacit knowledge could be more easily overlooked
since it is more difficult to identify and capture and some may be reluctant to share.
Develop Common Taxonomy of Terms
The squadron would need a thorough understanding of many of the terms and
concepts identified in Chapter II. A well structured fact sheet on KM would be beneficial
to share with squadron members.
Key Subtask: Identify Type of KM Effort to Pursue
It is clear from the data that the reuse of organizational knowledge would be the
preferred direction for the KM initiative for the 738th EIS. The implementation of a
knowledge library, or knowledge repository, seems the best method of KM to pursue.
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Most of the knowledge needed to complete project packages can somewhat easily be
codified and stored for reuse and the use electronic discussions could enable the access
and use of the tacit knowledge of experienced personnel. It is recommended that
standard templates for the different commodities be constructed by trusted sources and
their use advocated.
As one team chief recommended common folders for each project should be
developed for each project. The folder and contents could be either electronic or
hardcopy. The folder could contain site survey results, notes, drawings, project
requirements, pictures, etc. that are accessible to all squadron members.
Step 4: Identify Potential KM Project Variables Affecting Implementation and
Success
This step will allow for the researcher to identify potential KM variables affecting
implementation and success of the potential projects identified in Step 4. This step will
only cover project variables for Project 1.
Project 1: Creation of 738th Knowledge Library/Repository
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Senior Leadership Interest and Project Sponsorship
Just as in any new initiative any military organization undertakes senior support
would be crucial. Senior support for any KM initiative would be required to give the
project both visibility and credibility. It is recommended that members feel confident
that this initiative could provide value to the organization and that it would receive full
attention from management. The commander agreed and offered his complete support
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but with some conditions "timing is key…because of the AFMC to ACC transition I
wouldn't support a KM effort until the 'dust' settles. [Too] much change [too] quickly."
Requirement to:
Capture and Codify Desired Knowledge
Capturing and codifying what the 738th needs to engineer its projects would be
the key of this project and it is recommended that this become an integral part of how it
conducts its day-to-day business. Care should be taken to ensure this codification process
is as non-intrusive as possible to the knowledge providers and the time required to do so
is kept to a minimum. Desired knowledge could include team chief/project engineer
initial notes/pictures from site survey, project support agreements, project packages,
lessons learned and best business practices, etc.
Share Knowledge (Tacit and Explicit)
Once the repository is established it could be shared easily to all squadron
members. Best practices and lessons learned are key tacit knowledge resources; these
resources would provide an opportunity for the entire organization to learn from the
experiences of others. Membership in a CoP would allow for sharing of critical
information and knowledge via an electronic library, uploaded documents, and links to
pertinent web-sites. The CoP could also allow access to critical tacit knowledge through
features that facilitate community-based electronic discussion. Methods of recognizing
those that share their knowledge may be incorporated and members that share should
never feel their jobs are in jeopardy. Many believe in the old adage that knowledge is
power; that paradigm needs to be breached through advocacy for sharing.
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Access Knowledge
To be successful the library must be accessible to all squadron members all the
time. One benefit of using the Air Force Knowledge Now website would be that the site
could be accessible twenty four (24) hours a day, and accessible from sites other than .mil
through the Air Force Portal. One downside to this, however, may be the reliability of
the AF Portal. Members at the AFKN site state the reliability of their site is excellent,
but they, too, worry about the reliability of the AF Portal. This capability could provide
an advantage over the 738th's IT infrastructure which currently doesn't enable VPN
capabilities. Some variables that could affect the success of this project are those which
are out of the control of the squadron and include network downtime, quality of service
issues, power outages, etc.
The repository through AFKN would not only allow world-wide access to critical
captured knowledge, but it could also facilitate the use of the tacit knowledge of those
squadron members away from home through the use of electronic discussion.
Reuse Knowledge
The library, or knowledge repository, would allow for reuse of key organizational
knowledge pertinent to the project engineering process. Best practices and lessons
learned could ensure the knowledge being reused is the best and most trusted available.
To receive the greatest value, the squadron should advocate the reuse of internal
knowledge whenever possible.
Create New Knowledge (Collaboration & Knowledge Sharing)
Knowledge creation is usually the direct result of knowledge sharing or
collaboration. When existing knowledge is transferred to another member of the
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organization the creation of knowledge has occurred. This creation can lead to further
organizational knowledge creation as new EI techniques and procedures are openly
discussed and shared. It is recommended that members be rated and openly praised for
what they share and not what they know or "hoard."
Develop Project Goals, Expected Outcomes, & Performance
Measures
This would have to be something the commander and civilian leaders determine.
The researcher feels the goal of this project would be to create a knowledge repository of
everything imaginable that is required to engineer projects. Performance measures could
focus on how the KM effort has affected business processes and not how large the
repository is or how often it is used. Expected outcomes and performance measures
would have to be a decision the commander, and his/her staff, agrees upon. The key
things to remember are--Why are we creating this repository and for whom?
Key Subtask: Identify Key Project Variables that will affect Project
Implementation & Success
To ensure all squadron members take part in the knowledge repository initiative it
must be easy to use, non-intrusive to employee's normal daily operations, and not time
intensive. The majority of time could be spent up front in the initial stages of
implementation creating a trusted and comprehensive repository. Once established,
members would gain a greater appreciation for the repository as the knowledge within
could be reused, shared, and built upon with little effort. It is recommended that efforts
of the knowledge repository always be focused on providing support to and improving
the project engineering process.
92

As with any change an organization undergoes the squadron commander and
senior civilian managers need to stay actively engaged with the process and remain active
participants. If management fails to use or advocate the use of the repository it could fail.
Management could improve the chance for success by being clear and concise when
detailing to squadron personnel the desired outcome of the KM project. Motivational
practices could be incorporated to encourage use of the repository by squadron members.
It is urged to focus awards and praise on promoting a sharing and not a "hoarding"
culture.
When relying on communications over the computer network, it is advised that
the squadron plan for unexpected downtime. If squadron members aren't accessing the
Internet from a .mil site, with reliability problems at the AF Portal, access to the AFKN
website may not always be accessible. However, it has been determined that .mil sites
can expect greater reliability. The key would be to allow for flexibility and not to rely
only solely on AFKN when teams are deployed or on an installation.
To summarize, some key variables that could affect project implementation and
success include:
•

There must be a direct link to improving project engineering process

•

Members must be motivated to use repository; change the "hoarding" culture

•

It is advised senior management stay engaged and communicate clear purpose

•

Network downtime must not impede knowledge transfer; be flexible

Step5: Identify Success Factors for Project Variables
This step will help to identify the factors that may make the knowledge repository
project more of a success. These success factors are based solely upon the knowledge
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repository project. This step will conclude with the final project selection and suggested
implementation strategies.
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
Senior Leadership Interest and Project Sponsorship
As with any change an organization undergoes the squadron commander and
senior civilian managers need to stay actively engaged with the process and remain an
active participant. If management fails to use or advocate the use of the repository it
could fail.
KM Project Should Provide Substantial & Measurable Value to the
Organization
There are numerous methods to measure value to the organization from the
knowledge repository. One source of value to the organization may be the decrease in
time it takes to engineer projects. This could allow more time to train for wartime
mission requirements. Other value may come in the form of decreased mistakes in
project packages. Decreasing mistakes may result in greater reputation for the 738th, less
customer frustration, less critical communication system downtime, and greater financial
savings to both the customer and the 738th.
People may feel a greater sense of pride and value in their contribution to the
goals of the squadron if they are commended for using the KM system. Value may
manifest itself as greater morale and esprit de corps, something that has reportedly been
decreasing at the 738th in recent years.
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Employee Compensation Structured to Encourage Employee Utilization
This isn't always possible with military employees. However, other options such
as compensation time off, recognition awards, and structuring in-house award systems to
honor and recognize those that participate in the initiative can be utilized to encourage
repository use. Of the civilian companies that have received great results from their KM
initiative, one promoted it best by giving away laptop computers to the top "knowledge
sharers" (Davenport et al., 1998). Although this may not be possible to a military
organization a PALM Pilot or similar incentives may be a suitable alternative. Simply,
the squadron could be creative and make awards meaningful to squadron members and
worth achieving.
Policies & Guidance Developed to Support & Encourage KM Use &
Acceptance
Implementing policy may promote the long term use of the knowledge repository.
Policy could outline management support, procedures for use, archival plans, and
measurements on use of the repository. Any additional in-house policy regarding civilian
and military decorations, awards, performance reports, etc., may be updated or revised to
include provisions for identifying and promoting those that participate in knowledge
sharing and knowledge repository usage.
Tie KM Project to Business Process
The knowledge repository would be directly related to the project engineering
process. In the long-term other process may benefit from the KM project.
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KM Project is Focused on People & Processes, not Technology
The focus of the repository should be on maintaining a knowledge base for future
squadron members. When building the repository it's important to be conscious of the
people that will be using it most and base its content design with them in mind. Those
using the repository would be current members of the squadron and those members that
have PCSed but still have critical knowledge. It could also be utilized by the 19 Air
National Guard EI units thereby greatly enhancing the depth and breadth of available
knowledge. The knowledge base of the system could ensure knowledge accessibility to
those members directly engaged in the project engineering process, from the moment the
project is accepted from the customer to the point the customer accepts the installed
project.
The technology used in the repository should always be viewed as nothing more
than an enabler to any initiative. It is strongly recommended that if the technology
should fail other options are available to facilitate the accessibility and transfer of
knowledge core to the project engineering process.
Identify & Map Tacit & Explicit Knowledge Repositories
The primary purpose of this project would be the actual codification of the
explicit knowledge needed to support the project engineering process. It is recommended
that the squadron perform an in-depth knowledge audit of what would be required for this
process. The analysis of the explicit knowledge could include team chief and project
engineer initial notes/pictures from site survey, project support agreements, project
packages, Air Force Instructions, Major Command Instructions, Standard Installation
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Practices Technical Orders, communication product manuals, lessons learned and best
business practices, etc.
Additionally, all tacit knowledge could be identified and be made accessible
through the use of a knowledge map and community-based electronic discussions. The
community-based electronic discussions could assist the project engineer while the
assigned team chief is TDY or deployed to another project. These open discussions
could also be beneficial in pooling the entire organizations knowledge in making
decisions on difficult projects.
Can KM be Implemented Within Current Organizational Structure?
This project could be implemented with the current organizational structure. The
IT structure, on the other hand, if the 738th elects to provide the repository in-house,
would have to be re-structured to provide READ/WRITE access to common folders
assigned for project engineering. Also, technology to enable VPN or remote access
capabilities from any location in the world would have to be addressed. However, longterm planning may include an organizational re-structure to include at least two civilian
positions per element to provide personnel with a knowledge base.
Key Subtask: Finalize KM Project Selection
The final KM project selection proposed to the 738th EIS would be the launch of
a knowledge repository for use throughout the project engineering process. This
knowledge repository could be maintained in-house at the 738th on available IT
resources, or through establishing an on-line Community of Practice (CoP) on the Air
Force Knowledge Now (AFKN) web site which has recently received recognition as the
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Air Force Center of Excellence for Knowledge Management by the Chief Information
Officer (CIO) of the Air Force (Gilligan, 2004) .
According to the Knowledge Now web site a Community of Practice workspace:
Provides a web-based collaborative environment where members of a group use
shared information and administrative and communications tools to conduct
business, manage a project, keep abreast of important group issues and solve
group problems. You can choose your CoP capabilities, revise its structure, and
manage your content (AFKN, 2004).

Establishing a Community of Practice (CoP) on AFKN would allow the following
capabilities, anywhere and at anytime for the 738th (AFKN, 2004):
•

Document posting/sharing (searchable)

•

Discussion area (searchable)

•

CoP points of contact email directory

•

Search of CoP documents and selected websites

•

Knowledge owner control/update of web links on CoP pages

•

Calendar with daily/monthly/yearly views

•

News ticker

•

Mailing List

•

Change alert feature

•

Selective access option
These services would all be available to the squadron at no expense. It is

suggested that a team of individuals be assembled, at least one from each
section/element, to act as a knowledge team to identify knowledge needed for their
prospective section/element and selected sources. This team would also ensure web links
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and email directories in the CoP remain current. A key to remember, though, is that
access from a network other than .mil would have to be through the AF Portal. Squadron
members would need a Portal account.
Where feasible, everything that can be codified, or put into digital format, should
be. It is recommended to have templates developed for common types of jobs with
examples of how the package could be developed. To improve accessibility it is advised
to have all operating instructions, technical orders, technical manuals, standard
installation practices, and project reports centrally located. To improve procedures and
processes a lessons learned and business best practices program could be implemented.
It's recommended that each package developed by the project engineering team be
digitally recorded on a squadron server that all squadron members have access to. The
military officer engineer would be responsible for ensuring lessons learned are
documented and started from the beginning of the project from the site survey, project
package development, installation, and quality assurance report (if available).
Along with the codified material, the squadron could create a knowledge map of
the organization and post it within the library or within the AFKN work area to assist in
identifying tacit knowledge "repositories." Identify knowledgeable team chiefs,
installers, civilians, and project engineers and post their background, their specialty, their
picture, and a contact number.
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Research Question Answered
The research question for this effort was:
How well does the Bower-Phillips decision framework support an organization's
decision making process for selecting specific knowledge management (KM) projects?
The researcher and key case study subjects found the framework to be useful in
identifying KM opportunities and potential projects in the real-world setting at the 738th
EIS. It's important to note that most members interviewed had no previous background
on the subject of knowledge management; however, each had a fair comprehension of the
basics and an awareness of its importance.
The Bower-Phillips decision framework was extremely beneficial in focusing data
collection efforts to determine knowledge management opportunities and potential
projects for the AF organization under study. The Key Factors Affecting the Decision
Process within each step were instrumental in identifying specific areas of investigation
in pools of data. These key factors kept the focus of the investigator and key informants
on track and the Key Subtask of each step ensured those participating in the study
achieved the desired outcome of the overall step.
Upon reviewing the findings of the case study the commander of the 738th EIS
stated that he was extremely pleased with the information the study provided and that he
was interested in a few of its recommendations. Specifically this commander was "most
interested in capturing organizational knowledge, establishing post-job formal feedback,
and improving [quality assurance] QA information flow." The way the data were
categorized using the framework appeared to support the decision capacity of this
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commander. Therefore, within the context of this case study, the decision framework
can, in fact, be useful to those organizations wishing to implement KM.
Each step encompassed the specifics of the practice of knowledge management
consistent with current KM practice as detailed by practitioners and discovered in the
initial literature review. When implemented in this case study, the framework supported
the commander's process for identifying and selecting a KM project.
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V. Discussion
Chapter Overview
This chapter will discuss the findings of the case study, address limitations
specific to the study, and outline recommendations for future research.
Discussion
The Air Force has outlined knowledge management as one if it's goals as detailed
in the Air Force's Transformation Flight Plan, Information Resources Flight Plan, and
Information Strategy, but it falls short of providing any guidance to subordinate
organizations (AF/CIO, 2002, 2004; HQ-USAF/XPXC, 2003). Absent an Air Force level
knowledge strategy, knowledge management strategy, or knowledge management
framework and as Air Force organizations look to implement knowledge management,
commanders and managers need a comprehensive "roadmap" to assist in identifying
potential KM opportunities.
It appears from this effort that the decision framework developed for identifying
and selecting KM initiatives designed in March 2001 by the research effort of Captain
William Bower and subsequent additions to the framework by 1st Lt Jeffrey Phillips can
be used to assist the decision process to identify and select potential KM opportunities in
an Air Force organization.
As stated previously the findings of this research were forwarded to the
commander of the 738th EIS in an effort to elicit feedback on the usefulness of the
results. This feedback process was deemed an appropriate measure given that the
researcher was the primary instrument in this study. The framework appeared to aid the
decision process of the researcher in identifying and selecting KM projects for the 738th
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EIS, but it was believed that the study would hold greater value if the commander agreed
with the researcher's conclusions. An agreement between the researcher and the
commander could be considered credible evidence of the validity and usefulness of the
framework. The commander and researcher were in agreement with the findings.
Observations on the use of the Bower-Phillips Framework
The key factors affecting decision process within each step were all supportive of
focusing data collection and ensuring successful completion of each key subtask.
Initially it seemed that there were too many key factors within each step, but as the
interviews progressed and the raw data were placed into the matrices developed it
became evident that the analysis became less difficult. Although some of the key factors
affecting decision process seemed impossible to answer, for example in Step 1, Future
Knowledge Requirements, and Step 2, Value of Tacit and Explicit Organizational
Knowledge, they would at least invoke deep thought by the practitioner or user of the
framework in a topic otherwise potentially overlooked or rarely considered.
As stated earlier, this framework, in essence, is itself a KM initiative; it
incorporates the collective knowledge management principles and success factors
relevant in current KM literature. The key factors appeared to agree with existing KM
literature and existing KM frameworks found during the literature review. The overall
usefulness in data collection in a real-word setting was supported by this effort.
The key factors found to be the most important within the framework were senior
leadership interest and project sponsorship, analysis of current business processes, and
organizational culture. These seemed to be the main focus throughout the data analysis
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phase and without a good understanding of these three factors potential KM opportunities
would be difficult to judge.
One general observation, and recommendation for future KM frameworks, would
be to change the title Key Subtask of each step to Step Objective. The term Key Subtask
is slightly misleading and leads the user to believe there are other subtasks to be
completed when, in fact, it really isn't a key subtask it is the overall goal of the step.
Observations for Step 1:
It may be valuable to provide a more clear definition of a knowledge strategy.
The knowledge strategy is the notion of a knowledge-based strategy or competitive
strategy constructed around an organization's intellectual resources and capabilities (M.
H. Zack, 2002).
It seems apparent that many military organizations, as found within this study,
may equate the knowledge strategy more with their training policy. Without greater
direction provided at the Air Force level it isn’t surprising that a knowledge strategy
remains a nebulous concept. If the knowledge strategy is basically defining what the
organization needs to do with its knowledge resources to be more effective, then some
focus and tie-in with the military organization's mission and vision is necessary.
Rightfully so, establishing a knowledge strategy is the very first undertaking of this
framework and it should guide any KM initiative.
It may prove beneficial to analyze current business processes in Step 1 instead of
in Step 2. The key to knowing what knowledge an organization needs for the future will
be dependent upon the organization's key processes. Identifying processes early in the
model can also assist in identifying those processes that are candidates of re-engineering
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to provide better value to the organization and customers (which the 738th actually has).
It is also widely accepted that KM should focus more on the processes themselves than
the end result (Bower, 2001).
Observations for Step 2:
The key factor entitled Potential to Create a Learning Organization is covered
more in-depth in Step 3. It may be more practical for the practitioner to consider this
with the other organizational culture factors in Step 3.
Observations for Step 3:
It is the belief of this researcher that this step is the ideal location to include a key
factor for identifying a knowledge management strategy. Once the KM project has been
identified the knowledge management strategy will guide and define the processes and
infrastructure for managing knowledge (M. H. Zack, 2002). It is also advised that this
knowledge management strategy ultimately tie back to achieving the knowledge strategy
identified in Step 1.
The key factor entitled Learning Initiative is a repeat from the key factor entitled
Potential to Create a Learning Organization in Step 2. As recommended above, this key
factor can be removed from Step 2 since this rightfully falls within organizational culture.
Observations for Step 6:
This step included a key factor entitled Employee Compensation Structured to
Encourage Employee Utilization. This step isn't realistic in a military organization if it's
taken in the context of financial compensation. Other factors, however, can be
implemented and include structuring performance reports and recognition awards to
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fulfill this requirement. Therefore, it is recommended that the somewhat unsuitable title
be changed to something like Motivational Factors.
Significance of Research
Using this theoretical framework in a real-world field environment demonstrated
its usefulness. Each step of the framework encompassed the specifics of the practice of
knowledge management consistent with current KM practice as detailed by practitioners
and discovered in the initial literature review. In the absence of an Air Force level
framework encompassing knowledge management, this framework will ensure those
organizations looking to implement KM have a tool that may lead them through a
successful initiative.
The step by step process and key factors within each step, clearly aided the
researcher with data collection and analysis. It is believed the concepts of the framework
can be utilized by commanders and senior level managers that possess a formal
management education or background.
Limitations of the Research
It should be known that the researcher for this case study had previously been
assigned to the 738th EIS as a project engineer. As prescribed by Yin, the researcher
should give considerable effort to "be unbiased by preconceived notions" (2003). A
certain level of bias may have been present although efforts were made to remain
objective throughout this research.
Also, throughout this case study there was only one researcher. Yin states that
numerous researchers are beneficial in data collection when:
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1. a single case calls for intensive data collection at the same site, requiring a
"team" of investigators;
2. a case study involves multiple cases, with different persons being needed to
cover each site or rotate to the others sites; or
3. a combination of the first two conditions (Yin, 2003)
Only one researcher was available to travel to conduct this case study over what
was scheduled to be one week, but turned out to be two days. All of the data collection
and interviews were performed by the single researcher at the site selected for the study.
Care was taken to carefully plan the site visit given that proponents of case study research
agree that a single case study researcher may be sufficient if a sound methodology and a
well designed case study exist prior to data collection (Yin, 2003). Additional
researchers may have been beneficial during data gathering and analysis due to the time
constraints encountered and the amount of information collected.
An additional limitation of this case study is replication. Although this effort used
a framework that provides a set of parameters in which to gather data, the results
achieved by another organization using the same framework may not be comparable to
those obtained in this effort (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001).
Recommendations for Future Research
If the 738th EIS implements a proposed KM project as a result of this effort, it
would be valuable to revisit the squadron and assess the success of its initiative. This
will help guide future research on the model/framework and specifically Steps 4 and 5.
In this effort, the researcher investigated an organization and applied the data
gathered to the steps of the framework. A follow-on case study could be one that the
researcher observes an organization and its subjects as they perform an internal
investigation using the same Bower-Phillips framework.
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Further research needs to focus on the development of an overarching Air Force
knowledge strategy and knowledge management strategy. Both are instrumental to the
success of any KM effort. In the absence of these, no framework or initiative will have
credibility without support from senior AF leadership.
Currently the Air Force relies heavily on the Air Force Knowledge Now (AFKN)
site for KM implementation and Community of Practice (CoP) management. Further
research needs to analyze how this framework compares to the theoretical basis of the
AFKN Workshop. The Workshop is available to organizations wishing to implement a
CoP; a team of experts from AFKN travels to the organization to assist with the
development of a KM effort. Research should compare/contrast this framework with
AFKN Methodology.
Finally, future research is needed on military and Air Force culture. More
specifically, a review of factors that are within performance reports should be changed
from an individual perspective to how that person shares, collaborates, mentors, etc. for
the benefit of a group or organization. Since one of the major factors contributing to the
success or failure of KM initiatives relies upon people and how people interact, efforts
need to be made to encourage their participation while not preventing them from
promotion and successful military or civilian careers.
Conclusion
The explanatory case study performed to test the theoretical foundation of the
Bower-Phillips decision framework proved that the framework can be useful to an
organization's decision makers in identifying and selecting KM opportunities. The
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framework should not be considered all inclusive and should evolve and be updated as
KM in the commercial industry, the Air Force, and the Department of Defense matures.
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Appendix A: Bower-Phillips Decision Framework
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Appendix B: Interview Guide and Questions
Overview
The purpose of this guide is to simply provide a "window" into how the
interviewees were selected, the procedures and administration of the pre-interview
process, and how the interviews were conducted. Also included is a list of the initial and
follow-up interview questions.

Selection of Interviewees
Those selected to participate in this qualitative study were purposive rather than
random (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The initial choice of informants was based upon the
perceived openness of the informant to discuss the issues under study. These initial
informants led the researcher to additional key participants. All participants were
volunteers and their participation was confidential.

Pre-Interview Process
The researcher discussed the nature of the study and gave a simple overview of
knowledge management with each individual informant. A handout covering the BowerPhillips Model was provided and discussed in detail. Each participant was a volunteer
and reassured they would remain anonymous throughout the study. They then read and
signed the following (all documents are included as attachments):
•
•

Informed Consent for Research on Identifying Potential Knowledge
Management Opportunities for the 738th EIS
Informed Consent for Quoting Interview
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Conducting the Interviews
The interviews were conducted individually in a place comfortable to the
informant (usually their office). The interview was audio tape-recorded to allow the
researcher the opportunity to focus on what was being said, read facial expressions, and
ask follow-up questions without having to stop to take notes. The researcher followed a
combination of the unstructured general interview guide approach, in which the same
general areas of information are collected from each informant, and the informal,
conversational interview in which the researcher remained open and adaptable to the
interviewee's nature and priorities (Valenzuela & Shrivastava, 2003). The length of each
interview ranged from thirty (30) minutes to one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes.

Initial Interview Questions
The interview questions were developed by the researcher to facilitate some of the
data gathering and analysis on knowledge management (KM) without always using the
term "knowledge management." Since KM is still not a widely known concept, a
conscious effort was made to remove nebulous and confusing terms. The questions were
carefully drafted based upon the researcher's intimate knowledge of the squadron and the
concepts of KM contained within the Bower-Phillips Model. As recommended by
Valenzuela & Shrivastava these were semi-structured interviews that contained questions
that were asked to simply facilitate follow-on questions (2003). While some of the initial
questions focused primarily on squadron demographics, mission, and work processes a
number of questions focused on the usability of the Bower-Phillips Model.
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Generic Demographic/Mission:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

When did you arrive at the 738th?
When are you scheduled to leave the 738th? Do you plan to separate, retire, or
PCS within 2yrs, 4yrs, 6 years?
What is your AFSC?
What flight/division do you work in? What is your function?
Are you a team chief?
How long did it take you to become a team chief? What is the process?
Do you know of any fellow E&Iers that aren't TC but should be? Why are they
being held up?
Are you on a UTC?
Have you attended the Lightning Force Program? Thoughts?
Approx how many days were you TDY in the past year?
Have you deployed in support of Operation's Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Iraqi
Freedom (OIF)?
Where were you deployed to? (Note all places with associated dates)
Does E&I work independently of any deployed comm.?
Were you aware of any Guard E&I units operating in close proximity to your
unit? (If Yes, please list all, where they were and how you knew about them)
Do you always have computer access when TDY?
Did you have computer network capability at your deployed location?
Did you have SIPRNET access? STU-III? SAT Phone (Irridium)?
How quickly were you “on-line” after your arrival?
Does E&I use a community of practice?
What knowledge resources do you rely on most when deployed or TDY doing
your job? TOs, people, other units, other comm./guard units?
How often did you use actual SIPTOs/TOs for operations?
What other sources of knowledge would have been most beneficial to you in the
field?
Have you ever been TDY, encountered a problem, to return home and realize
somebody at the 738th had the answer?
Did you file any kind of incident reports while you are TDY/deployed?
Do you file an after actions report, lessons learned, etc., upon your return from
TDYs/deployments? If so, where did it go and how is it shared with other
flights/departments/Guard units?
How did you file them and where did they end up?
Do you have access to Guard units lessons learned?
If you had access to other units reports, what main areas of the report would be of
most value to you?
What is the main reason for the completion of lessons learned/trip reports? In
their current form/use do you believe they are useful?
Did your commander or senior official advocate filing reports/lesson learned? Is
it governed by policy?
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Do lessons learned/after action reports ever make it to the Lightning Force
Program?
How well did you communicate with Guard E&I units? What about when you're
TDY?
How did you train prior to deploying?
Do you feel you were properly trained for the scenarios you encountered?
What could have made your training better?
When you personally have a question about something, where's the first place you
go? People, TO, Intra/Internet, TOs, CDCs?
How well do civilians/military interact? share knowledge?
Are civilian needs different than military?
Do civilians serve on UTCs? For what skills? How are they selected for UTCs?
How often do military/civilians deploy/TDY together?
Talk me through a typical day at the 738th.

Project Engineers:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Whom do you seek out when engineering a package? Why?
How long does it take to engineer project? Average?
Why the current process of officers engineering projects? Does this process
provide the most value to the customer/unit?
How are projects prioritized?
How is it determined whether or not project is to be engineered by enlisted
TC/officer?
How long (avg) has TC been doing E&I/comm.?
How long (avg) has officer been doing E&I/comm.?
Where does expertise in AutoCAD, MicroStation reside?
Reference data for drawings? Is there still only one hard copy, do people know
how to access them @ the 38th? Why not create a direct link from the Intranet
site?
How often do you re-use project support agreements/project packages?

Commander--Operations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is the mission of the 738th?
Where do you see E&I in 5 years?
How is E&I different from combat comm. units?
How does what E&I does during peacetime prepare them for war?
How does the 738th decide which projects to select from the TFG? Possibly
limiting it's knowledge base?
How is it determined what the 738th can/can't do?
Who determines what TC/personnel will work on which projects?
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What are the decisions based on? Who makes the decision; what if they weren't
available?
Are projects that have found to be a challenge to E&I, either at war or home
(through lessons learned/trip reports), reaccepted for additional projects? Are
these targeted for additional training?
Why is the organization structured the way it is?
When is the 738th going to fall under ACC? What efforts are underway to
account for this transition? (AFIs, ACCIs, etc)
How will this effect AEF rotations?
What AEFs does the 738th currently support? How many UTCs?
QA reports--"best seen"/"unacceptable" practices shared throughout squadron?
Briefed/Trained in Lightning Force Program?
How many ECRAs per package (avg)? When officer engineers? When enlisted
TC engineers?
How many mistakes in past year? How did it/could it have cost the
customer/738th?

Commander email Follow-up Questions
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Do you have a copy of the E&I Strategic Plan? (Can I possibly get a copy?)
Do you foresee any budget cuts once the 738th transfers to ACC?
Do you foresee any manning changes once the 738th transfers to ACC?
What are your thoughts about placing civilians in charge of flights or other high
level positions? What would be the main reason you wouldn't place civilians in
charge?
I've noticed all flights have an officer in charge. Is this mainly for the officer's
professional development or do you feel more comfortable with having a military
chain of command?
What value do you place on civilian positions?
Have you ever considered asking the 38th for additional civilian positions?
Have you ever considered placing civilians in each section/flight for a long-term
knowledge base?
How well do you feel the squadron communicates across flights?
How would you judge the current morale based upon the high ops tempo?
Do you feel there's something the squadron should be able to perform that it
currently isn't capable of performing? For example, is there any technology that
the 738th currently can't support based upon lack of experienced personnel?
Have you ever disciplined any squadron personnel for taking risks or making an
error while on duty (other than gross negligence or serious discipline issues)? For
example, ordering a wrong part on a project package or trying something new on
an installation and something bad happens?
Knowledge management (KM) relies heavily on senior level support for its
success. Would you be willing to support a KM effort by encouraging its use and,
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•
•
•

if necessary, incorporate policy or develop a knowledge team or knowledge
owners to manage the squadron's effort?
Do all squadron members have an Air Force Portal account?
Were you aware of the Air Force's Knowledge Now website?
Did you know that you can create a Community of Practice (CoP) on this site,
free of charge, unlimited storage capacity (any type of files)? (This would allow
collaboration among squadron members, worldwide, anytime through the AF
Portal…)

Framework Specific Questions (General)
•
•
•
•
•
•

What is your initial impression of the Model?
What key factors affecting decision process within each step of the model are
easiest to understand? Most difficult?
If you were tasked to use this model to identify potential knowledge management
opportunities for your squadron could you?
What, if any, key factors affecting decision process can be added, modified, or
removed for accuracy, clarity, and ease of use of the model in identifying
potential knowledge management opportunities?
Are any of the terms in the framework new to you?
How can data collected using this framework influence your decision making
ability?

These questions were prepared to facilitate discussion about specific steps of the
framework if an interviewee needed clarification on the Key Aspects Affecting Decision.
Step 1-- Analyze Corporate Strategic Objectives Using SWOT
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) Methodology
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What are the strategic objectives of the 738th?
What knowledge do you feel is required to achieve these objectives?
Do you know if the squadron has a corporate knowledge vision & strategy?
What do you feel are the future knowledge requirements of the 738th?
Where does the current organizational knowledge reside?
o Captured or Known
o Uncaptured or Unknown
What are your current & future information requirements?
Do you know of any specific opportunities to capitalize on organizational
knowledge?
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Step 2-- Identify & Analyze Potential Knowledge Management
Opportunities
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Do you feel senior leadership will be interested & sponsor a KM project?
What current business processes are you involved with that can be a potential
knowledge management opportunity?
What do you feel are currently considered the most valuable sources of
organizational knowledge? (tacit & explicit)
In its current state how available & usable is this current organizational
knowledge? (tacit & explicit)
Where do you see the most threat for the potential loss of critical organizational
knowledge?
Do you feel the current organizational structure would support and utilize
knowledge management initiatives?
Is current organizational structure conducive to knowledge sharing?
Analyze existing IT infrastructure:
o How is Intranet organized? Taxonomy? Easy to use, private drives, how
do you know which files are most current?
o What resources are hard-copied but can be converted to e-copy for ease of
use?
o What's current storage capacity of network resources?
o What's used most often, hard copy or electronic?
o Are most proficient with computers?
o Who makes the policy, and what is the policy, for permissions/rules for
section folders? For example, who determines who should have READ or
READ/WRITE permissions for EEEP files?
o What is the hardware storage capacity for the 738th? How has it
increased/decreased in past few years? Are there any changes coming up?
o Does the 738th have an archival plan for digital files?
o Please describe to me the structure of the 738th network. When I was
there the network was routed through the base, is this still the case? Are
738th servers physically at the 738th? Any quality of service issues?
o Any future plans for 738th network upgrades?
o Does the 738th have VPN capability? Any plans for it in the future.
o What's the annual budget for IT? Is there anything you need but haven't
been able to purchase because of $$ or security issues? If so, what?
Identify potential opportunity to transform organization into a knowledge-based,
learning organization
Identify organizational resources available for knowledge management initiatives
Do you feel the 738th should pursue knowledge management opportunities?
Do you feel the potential advantages of knowledge management outweigh any of
the limitations identified in this step?
Do you feel a particular initiative will help the 738th achieve its organizational
strategic objectives and provide increased value?
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Step 3--Identify and Analyze Cultural Aspects of the
Organization
•

Discuss/ask about (specific to squadron):
o Communication
o Team orientation
o Trust
o Conflict
o Leadership support
o Learning
o Adaptability
o Tolerance for risk
o Strong and positive culture

•
•
•

Do you feel valued for what you are able to contribute on a daily basis?
Do you trust procedures provided to you by other team chiefs?
What recommendations would you make to improve info/knowledge sharing? In
garrison? Deployed? TDY?
Based upon your rank, do you feel your opinions matter to those making
decisions? In garrison? Deployed? TDY?
Do you feel you are rewarded more for what you know or what you share?
(EPR,OPR)
What are the requirements for the Team Chief of the year award? Squadron
awards/civilian awards?
How open are people to sharing? Culture? Recognition for innovation
"excellence in innovation."

•
•
•
•

Step 4-- Identify & Address Potential Knowledge Management
Projects
•
•
•
•
•
•

Do you feel senior leadership will support the project you've identified in the
previous step?
How can this potential KM effort support the key business process(es) identified
in Step 2?
Discuss the need to focus KM efforts on people & process(es), not technology.
What do you feel should be the scope and desired outcome of potential
knowledge management efforts/initiatives/projects we've identified?
What specific knowledge do you feel should be utilized by this KM effort?
How would you achieve the development of a common taxonomy of terms
(common language) for this effort?
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Step 5-- Identify & Address Knowledge Management Project
Variables Affecting Project Implementation & Success
•
•
•

Who do you see as being the major user of this KM effort?
What should be the requirements for this KM effort/project? (example: capture &
codify desired knowledge, reusing past experiences, sharing knowledge (tacit &
explicit), access to knowledge, reutilize knowledge, collaboration…)
How would you determine if this effort is successful? (example: project goals,
expected outcomes, performance measures, etc…)

Step 6-- Identify & Address Success Factors For Project
Variables Affecting the Successful Implementation of Knowledge Management
Projects
•

•

Discuss/question the need for:
o Senior leadership interest, internal project sponsorship, continued active
participation
o Selected KM project should provide substantial & measurable value to the
organization
o Employee compensation (?) should be structured to encourage employee
utilization (goal: institutionalize knowledge-based behavior into
organization; compensation can include recognition on performance
appraisals)
o Policies & guidance to support & encourage knowledge management use
and acceptance (goal: promote creation, sharing, & utilization of
organizational knowledge bases)
o Tie KM project to business process(es)
o KM project(s) should be focused on people & processes, not technology
o Factors that may potentially impact identification and mapping of
knowledge repositories
Can the knowledge management project be implemented with the existing
organizational structure and organizational culture?
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Attachment 1
Informed Consent for Research on
Identifying Potential Knowledge Management Opportunities for the 738th EIS
You are invited to participate in a research study of identifying knowledge
management (KM) opportunities for the 738th EIS. This research is to be conducted by
First Lieutenant Kevin Gabriel (Gabe) Budai. This research is in fulfillment of a Masters
degree program under the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and has been
sponsored by the 738 EIS Commander.
The objective of this research is to test the usability of a decision framework
designed to assist organizations in identifying and selecting knowledge management
projects. This will be accomplished by conducting a case study investigation of the 738th
EIS. This investigation will assist in determining usefulness of the framework model
while identifying any possible knowledge management opportunities that may exist to
benefit the squadron. Finally, this approach also allows the evaluation of key party views
on potential KM needs or opportunities that may otherwise be unknown to senior
leadership.
Semi-structured interviews, approximately one hour in length, will be conducted
with a sampling of squadron personnel. Organization documents, briefings, memos, etc.
will also be evaluated in order to determine critical historical and foundational
information pertinent to the research questions. Content analysis and pattern matching
will be used to analyze the interview data and organizational documents in order to
answer the research questions. The data collection will focus on the following
research/investigative questions:
Research Question
How well does the Bower-Phillips decision framework support an organization's
decision making process necessary to select specific knowledge management (KM)
projects?
If you elect to participate, you may also consent to have the interview audio taped.
You may further consent to be quoted. A copy of the interview transcripts will be made
available to you for final approval and release prior to use if you consent to be quoted.
Steps will be taken to protect the saved interview transcripts to include protected access
to the saved files and labeling of the files by assigned numbers instead of names.
Your participation is COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY. Due to the nature of the
interview questions, there is a small possibility of adverse repercussions from your
statements. Your name will be protected in the final write-up unless you do not consent
to be quoted. Your input is important to understand the academic support system
implementation effort and key leader influence behaviors. You may withdraw from this
study at any time without penalty, and your interview data will not be used in the
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research. Your decision to participate or withdraw will not jeopardize your relationship
with your department, the 738th EIS, the Air Force, or the Department of Defense
PRIVACY ISSUES: Records of my participation in this study may only be disclosed
according to federal law, including the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and its
implementing regulations (See Below).
If you have any questions concerning this research, please contact First Lieutenant Kevin
Budai at 937-256-8100 or kevin.budai@afit.edu or Dr. Alan Heminger at
alan.heminger@afit.edu.
HAVING READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED, YOU MUST DECIDE
WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY. YOUR
SIGNATURE INDICATES YOUR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE.
_______________________________
Participant’s Signature
Date

________________________________
Investigator’s Signature
Date

I ALSO AUTHORIZE THE AUDIOTAPING OF MY INTERVIEW.
_______________________________
Participant’s Signature
Date

________________________________
Investigator’s Signature
Date

Privacy Act Statement
Authority: We are requesting disclosure of personal information, to include your Social Security
Number. Researchers are authorized to collect personal information (including social security numbers) on
research subjects under The Privacy Act-5 USC 552a, 10 USC 55, 10 USC 8013, 32 CFR 219, 45 CFR
Part 46, and EO 9397, November 1943 (SSN).
Purpose: It is possible that latent risks or injuries inherent in this experiment will not be discovered until
some time in the future. The purpose of collecting this information is to aid researchers in locating you at
a future date if further disclosures are appropriate.
Routine Uses: Information (including name and SSN) may be furnished to Federal, State and local
agencies for any uses published by the Air Force in the Federal Register, 52 FR 16431, to include,
furtherance of the research involved with this study and to provide medical care.
Disclosure: Disclosure of the requested information is voluntary. No adverse action whatsoever will be
taken against you, and no privilege will be denied you based on the fact you do not disclose this
information. However, your participation in this study may be impacted by a refusal to provide this
information.
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Attachment 2
INFORMED CONSENT
FOR QUOTING INTERVIEW
For Research on
Identifying Potential Knowledge Management Opportunities for the 738th EIS
You have previously been provided the informed consent form that allowed you to elect
to participate in a research study to identify potential knowledge management
opportunities for the 738 EIS. If you have elected to participate, you were also given the
opportunity to have your interview audio taped.
In addition to the above options, you are also now given the opportunity to elect to have
certain portions of your interview “quoted”. If you elect to do so, the transcripts of your
interview will be returned to you for your approval prior to any use in the research.
Quoting may add validity to the research and make the final research product more useful
and understandable.
PRIVACY ISSUES: Records of my participation in this study may only be disclosed
according to federal law, including the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and its
implementing regulations (See Below).
HAVING READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED, YOU MUST DECIDE
WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW YOUR INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS TO BE
QUOTED. YOUR SIGNATURE INDICATES YOUR WILLINGNESS TO
PARTICIPATE.

______________________________
Participant’s Signature
Date

_______________________________
Investigator’s Signature
Date

Privacy Act Statement
Authority: We are requesting disclosure of personal information, to include your Social Security Number.
Researchers are authorized to collect personal information (including social security numbers) on research
subjects under The Privacy Act-5 USC 552a, 10 USC 55, 10 USC 8013, 32 CFR 219, 45 CFR Part 46, and
EO 9397, November 1943 (SSN).
Purpose: It is possible that latent risks or injuries inherent in this experiment will not be discovered until
some time in the future. The purpose of collecting this information is to aid researchers in locating you at
a future date if further disclosures are appropriate.
Routine Uses: Information (including name and SSN) may be furnished to Federal, State and local
agencies for any uses published by the Air Force in the Federal Register, 52 FR 16431, to include,
furtherance of the research involved with this study and to provide medical care.
Disclosure: Disclosure of the requested information is voluntary. No adverse action whatsoever will be
taken against you, and no privilege will be denied you based on the fact you do not disclose this
information. However, your participation in this study may be impacted by a refusal to provide this
information.
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Attachment 3

738TH EIS PARTICIPANT HANDOUT FOR CASE STUDY:
ASSESSING THE USEFULNESS OF THE DECISION FRAMEWORK FOR
IDENTIFYING AND SELECTING KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMNT PROJECTS

7-STEP KM PROJECT SELECTION DECISION PROCESS FRAMEWORK1
Step 1

Analyze Corporate Strategic Objectives Using SWOT (Strengths,
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) Methodology

Step 2

Identify & Analyze Potential Knowledge Management Opportunities

Step 3

Identify and Analyze Cultural Aspects of the Organization2

Step 4

Identify & Address Potential Knowledge Management Projects

Step 5

Identify & Address Knowledge Management Project Variables Affecting
Project Implementation & Success

Step 6

Identify & Address Success Factors For Project Variables Affecting the
Successful Implementation of Knowledge Management Projects

Step 7

Finalize Knowledge Management Project Selection

1

Bower, William D., Development of a Decision Framework for Knowledge Management Projects,
Masters Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2001.
2
Phillips, Jeffrey A., Incorporating Organizational Culture into a Decision Framework for Identifying and
Selecting Knowledge Management Projects, Masters Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2003.
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STEP 1 – Analyze Corporate Strategic Objectives Using SWOT Methodology
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Corporate Strategic Objectives
Knowledge Required to Achieve Strategic Objectives
Corporate Knowledge Vision & Strategy
Future Knowledge Requirements
Current Organizational Knowledge
♦ Captured or Known
♦ Uncaptured or Unknown
♦ Current & Future Information Requirements
♦ Opportunities to Capitalize on Organizational Knowledge

STEP 2 – Identify & Analyze Potential Knowledge Management Opportunities
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
♦ Senior leadership interest & project sponsorship
♦ Need senior mgmt/leadership involvement as knowledge management
champion(s)
♦ Will organizational leadership be active proponents of change and have they
made a long-term strategic commitment to knowledge management
♦ Identify and analyze current business processes for potential knowledge
management opportunities
♦ Identify potential opportunities to apply knowledge management to existing
business practices to achieve organizational strategic objectives while adding
value to the organization
♦ Perform valuation process on current organizational knowledge (tacit & explicit)
to determine current worth and potential to capitalize on existing knowledge to
create more value for the organization (strategic advantage)
♦ Base valuation on current business processes and corporate strategic
objectives
♦ Availability & Usability of current organizational knowledge (tacit & explicit)
♦ Should be part of initial valuation process
♦ Identify opportunities for exploiting existing organizational knowledge to
achieve strategic advantage and potential limitations if organizational
knowledge is not readily available and usable in current state (i.e. tacit
knowledge not identified or shared, explicit knowledge supporting core
business processes not readily available to potential users.
♦ Evaluate potential loss of critical organizational knowledge
♦ Personnel retire or switch employers
♦ Processes not properly documented so explicit knowledge is not captured for
future use
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♦

♦
♦

♦
♦

♦ No methodology in place for maintaining currency of existing organizational
knowledge (primarily explicit, but can be tacit as well)
Will current organizational structure support and utilize knowledge management
initiatives
♦ Is there great reluctance to share data or use other peoples’ data
♦ Will current organizational culture support the flow, transfer, and use of
information across functional and organizational boundaries
Is current organizational structure conducive to knowledge sharing
♦ Will organizational boundaries limit or inhibit the flow and transfer of
knowledge
Analyze existing IT infrastructure
♦ What level and type of knowledge management activities and initiatives will it
support
♦ Look at current state and future state based on IT strategic plan. Knowledge
management initiatives are heavily reliant on IT for information gathering,
storage, and transfer; infrastructure must support initial knowledge
management initiatives and be robust/dynamic enough to meet future demand
Identify potential opportunity to transform organization into a knowledge-based,
learning organization
♦ Organizational culture adjustment hardest obstacle to overcome
Identify organizational resources available for knowledge management initiatives
♦ Includes manpower, equipment (primarily IT), funding, a footprint (space),
and funding
♦ Will resources be dedicated for the duration of the knowledge
management initiatives
♦ ID current and future budget constraints
♦ Will project be expected to achieve ROI before it is feasible

STEP 3 – Identify and Analyze Cultural Aspects of the Organization
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
•

Address the following cultural issues:
o Communication
o Team orientation
o Trust
o Conflict
o Leadership support
o Learning
o Adaptability
o Tolerance for risk
o Strong and positive culture
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STEP 4 – Identify & Address Potential Knowledge Management Projects
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
♦ Senior leadership interest & project sponsorship
♦ Need continued active participation and involvement from senior leadership
♦ Need knowledge management champion and project sponsor
♦ Tie potential knowledge management efforts to key business processes identified
in Step 2
♦ Focus knowledge management efforts on people & processes, not the technology
♦ IT is just an enabler, the knowledge users and producers are the people and
processes within the organization
♦ Identify scope and desired outcome of potential knowledge management
efforts/initiatives/projects
♦ Define the knowledge to be utilized by the knowledge management effort
♦ Definition of knowledge should be tied directly to knowledge
valuation process performed in Step 2
♦ Develop common taxonomy of terms (common language)
♦ Everyone needs to be operating off of the same page and have the same
understanding of knowledge management definitions, desired outcomes,
goals, milestones, metrics, and expectations.

126

STEP 5 -- Identify & Address Knowledge Management Project Variables Affecting
Project Implementation & Success
Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
♦ Senior leadership interest & project sponsorship
♦ Need continued a Need knowledge management champion and project
sponsor active participation and involvement from senior leadership
♦ Identify customer(s)
♦ Define requirements of knowledge management effort/project
♦ Capture & codify desired knowledge
♦ Capturing & reusing past experiences
♦ Share knowledge (tacit & explicit)
♦ Access knowledge
♦ Reutilize knowledge
♦ Capturing & reusing past experiences
♦ Create New Knowledge
♦ Collaboration
♦ Knowledge Sharing
♦ Develop project goals, expected outcomes and performance measures
♦ Use performance measures/metrics to tie daily business activities to strategic
objectives
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STEP 6 – Identify & Address Success Factors For Project Variables Affecting the
Successful Implementation of Knowledge Management Projects

Key Factors Affecting Decision Process:
♦ Senior leadership interest & project sponsorship
♦ Need continued active participation and involvement from senior leadership
♦ Need knowledge management champion and project sponsor
♦ Knowledge management project should provide substantial & measurable value
to the organization
♦ Employee compensation should be structured to encourage employee utilization
♦ Goal should be to institutionalize knowledge-based behavior into organization
♦ Compensation is not necessarily financial; can be any compensation,
including recognition on performance appraisals, that promotes the sharing
and utilization of organizational knowledge
♦ Policies & guidance developed to support & encourage knowledge management
use and acceptance
♦ Goal should be to develop and implement policies and guidance that promotes
a knowledge-centric culture
♦ Promote creation, sharing, & utilization of organizational knowledge bases
♦ Tie knowledge management project to business process
♦ Knowledge management projects should be focused on people & processes, not
technology
♦ Identify factors that potentially impact the identification and mapping of
knowledge repositories
♦ Can the knowledge management project be implemented with the existing
organizational structure and organizational culture?
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